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Comment
A core issue
In the context of the crisis gripping the world’s fisheries, everyone seems to agree that
only sound and judicious management of resources will salvage most fisheries. Is
co-management one of the practicable tools in this mission?
In “Only Partnerships Work” (page 10 of this issue), Patrick McConney from Barbados,
a Small Island Developing State in the Caribbean, observes, “Fisheries authorities must
recognize that they need to form partnerships with the people in the fishing industry,
whether the process is called co-management, community-based management or some-
thing else.” Yet, in the context of Canada, a developed nation, where co-management
processes have been used to manage marine fisheries since 1995, Marc Allain tells us
that many leaders of fishermen see co-management as “yet another example of govern-
ment talking about grass-roots participation and consultation, but doing the opposite”
(‘The Way Forward’, page 14). He further points out the most serious criticism levelled
against the co-management approach in Canada, that it is a “smokescreen to advance
the government’s agenda to privatize fish resources and force everyone on to individual
transferable quotas”. Based on a document produced by the Canadian Council of
Professional Fish Harvesters, he elaborates how a co-management approach could
actually be adopted to a multi-species, inshore fisheries, to the potential satisfaction of
fishers.
This approach of co-management has its origins in the single-species fisheries of
developed countries. However, how relevant is it to the multi-species fisheries of
developing countries?  Co-management essentially means an arrangement between the
fishers and the government at different levels to manage fisheries through sharing
decision-making powers. Depending on how you use it, it can either lead to a dangerous
situation where genuine fishers are excluded from participating in a fishery or to a situation
where fishers are given an opportunity to responsibly manage their fishery.
Although fish is an important source of animal protein, foreign exchange and employment,
there is hardly any meaningful, planned fisheries management in most developing
countries. Fisheries are in crisis not because of poor management but often because of
no management at all. Many developing countries, although aware of the magnitude of
the problem, are unable to do anything because of paucity of funds and conflicting
priorities. In this context, a well-designed co-management regime, based on clearly
defined rights and responsibilities, could be quite useful, especially to save costs and to
legitimately manage the resources.
Since most developing countries lack the institutional framework within which a co-
management approach could succeed, attention should first be given to setting up such
arrangements. Though these are likely to be expensive in the short run, they should
become priority areas for governments and donor agencies. If we are bothered about
equity considerations, genuine fishworkers’ organizations are essential for the success
of the co-management approach. The emphasis on building successful and genuine
fishworkers’ organizations in the ‘development’ era in many Third World countries now
needs to be re-emphasized in the ‘management’ era as well.
A bottom-up co-management approach that is cost-effective, participatory and enjoys
the confidence of fishworkers might work in developing countries. But it all depends on
the kind of institutional capacity that can be built beforehand. More importantly, it depends
on building up genuine fishworkers’ organizations.
COMMENT
SAMUDRA APRIL 2000 1
Traditional fishers
Up against trawling
The traditional fishermen of North Sumatra 
have united to battle the threats posed by trawling
After the New Order government ofSuharto came into power in 1966,a new phase in Indonesia’s
development was initiated. This was
articulated in the Trilogy Pembangunan
(the Three Basic Principals of
Development) that aimed to achieve a
certain level of development. At the same
time, the New Order also took some steps
to maintain national stability, based on the
assumption that development targets
could only be achieved if national stability
was guaranteed. 
One of the strategies adopted for this was
to maintain the community’s focus on
development efforts. Another was to keep
the community away from political
activities, including the activities of
political parties. At the same time,
political parties were not allowed to make
contact with communities, especially in
rural areas. 
The New Order also established people’s
organizations, such as Himpunan
Kerukunan Tani Indonesia (HKTI)/
Indonesian Farmer Brotherhood
Organization) and Himpunan Nelayan
Seluruh Indonesia (HNSI) / Indonesia
Fishermen’s Organization). These were
actually linked to the ruling political
party. Fishworkers were allowed to join
only HNSI and farmers only HKTI.
Members of these organizations were
obliged to vote for the ruling party. Any
attempt to establish a new independent
organization would be branded as a
communist initiative by the government.
In practice, this system blocked the
aspirations of local people and made it
difficult for them to engage in any political
activity, except during the public
elections, once every five years. 
To accelerate the country’s development,
the government emphasized the
modernization of every sector. In
fisheries, the emphasis was on
substituting traditional fishing equipment
with modern craft and gear, in order to
improve the income of fishers. As part of
this drive, traditional fishers were
encouraged to replace traditional gear
with trawls, known in Indonesia as pukat
harimau. Credit incentives were provided
for this. Trawls were seen as having
several advantages, particularly greater
efficiency, which made possible higher
levels of fish production with minimal
human resources. Due to these various
benefits, the trawl soon became the gear of
choice in the modernization drive. 
However, this policy did not take into
account the fact that traditional fishermen
lacked the knowledge and training
needed to operate trawls. Moreover, they
could not afford to purchase the highly
priced trawls, despite credit incentives. As
a result, the policy actually benefited the
professionals within the sector, and did
little to improve the situation of
traditional fishermen. More often than
not, trawls were owned by investors, who
used skilled labour to operate the gear.
For the traditional sector, several negative
impacts resulted. With the use of trawls,
large catches became possible. But their
use also destroyed the coastal
environment and important spawning
and breeding grounds. Most of the
trawlers operated in the same coastal
waters used by traditional fishermen,
their ‘customary sea’, and competed
directly with them. 
Public property
This affected both the catches and the
income of the traditional fishermen.
Significantly, the concept of the
‘customary sea’ vanished when the
Government of Indonesia declared the sea
 
Indo
n
esia
SAMUDRA APRIL 2000 3
as ‘public property’, as stated in Ministry
of Agriculture Decree No.607/KPTS/
UM/9/1976. 
Forced to respond to the protests oftraditional fishers, the Governmentimplemented a trawl ban in 1980,
through Presidential Decree No.39/1980.
The use of trawls was banned in all
Indonesian territory, except in Irian Jaya
and Maluku, by Presidential Decree
No.12/1982). This ban was also supported
by a Decree of the Indonesian Supreme
Court (No. 8/1988). Despite this, in
practice, the ban has not been operational.
Vessels using trawls continue to operate in
Indonesian territory, especially in the
North Sumatra region. This situation has
forced the traditional fishers of North
Sumatra to undertake various actions. 
It is also significant that, until now, the
HNSI has failed to solve the problems
resulting from continued trawling
activities and has not been able to work
towards the implementation of the ban.
On the contrary, there is a tendency for the
HNSI to favour the trawler owners and to
even protect and provide cover to their
operations. 
There are several reasons that make it
difficult to implement the trawl ban. The
ban on trawling, under the Presidential
Decree No. 39/1980, was not supported
by effective monitoring and enforcement
at the regional level. Other government
policies have supported the continuation
of trawling activities. For instance, a
fisheries regulation of 4 July 1996 supports
the purchase of foreign boats by investors.
This, in effect, means the procurement of
trawlers. This has occurred in Belawan,
where there are at present 144 modern
fishing boats using trawl-like gear, named
otherwise to get past the law. 
There is no policy that specifically protects
traditional fishers, their gear and their
customary area of operation, from the
operation of modern fishing gear such as
trawls. Although there is a Fishery Law
that acknowledges the rights of these
traditional fishers to their customary sea,
this regulation is not operational.
The Regional Government Offices that
issue permits to fish often do not take into
account their impacts on the traditional
sector or, for that matter, on the coastal
environment. In fact, they tend to favour
the interests of the investors.
The institutions that are meant to
implement the trawl ban, such as the
marine force, the police and the fisheries
department, often have overlapping
responsibilities. Collusion tends to occur
between trawl owners and government
officials. For example, trawls that have
been confiscated by traditional fishers and
handed over to the authorities, are
released the very next day.
This situation has angered traditional
fishermen. And, not surprisingly, they
have taken several actions, such as
burning of trawlers. They feel that they
cannot depend on the official system to
take care of their interests.
The resentment of traditional fishermen
towards trawler owners is further
aggravated by the fact that they have
established a three-tier marketing
network of intermediary middlemen that
controls fish prices. The price at which the
consumer finally purchases the fish is very
high. Since traditional fishermen can only
sell their fish to the first middleman, they
get a very low price. They have no other
option but to go along with this system; if
not, they run the risk of not being able to
sell their catch at all. Any effort to establish
an alternative marketing structure is soon
destroyed by the marketing network
controlled by owners and investors. The
Fish Auction House that was supposed to
have functioned as the place for fishermen
to auction their catches has become part of
the owner-controlled marketing system.
The situation is similar in fishermen’s
co-operatives. 
Several meetings were held by
fishworkers between 1993 and 1998 to
discuss this situation. Fishermen and a
number of public figures in North
Sumatra participated in these meetings. It
became evident that to deal with these
problems, traditional fishermen in North
Sumatra must establish an independent
organization managed by the fishers
themselves.
Independent organization
Finally, on 14 July 1998, in Medan, an
independent fishermen’s organization
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was formed, called the Sarekat Nelayan
Sumatera Utara (SNSU) or North Sumatran
Fishers’ Union. 
About 900 traditional fishermenfrom three regions in NorthSumatra (Langkat, Asahan and
Deli Serdang) participated in this event.
SNSU aims primarily to draw the attention
of the government to the long-neglected
problems of traditional fishermen—for
instance, the problems caused by trawling
and other similar operations, and their
impacts on traditional fishermen and on
the coastal environment. 
The SNSU declaration was presented to the
Governor of North Sumatra and to the
Head of the Provincial Fishery
Department in North Sumatra. This led to
a dialogue between fishermen and the
Governor. The Governor promised that
the problem of trawling would be
resolved within a year. 
But this promise was never fulfilled. In
fact, the number of trawlers operating in
the area has increased, even as conflicts
between the trawlers and traditional boats
have risen.
Along the Sialang Buah coast, in the
district of Mengkudu in the Deli Serdang
region alone, 51 fishermen were injured
between 1993 and 1998. Of these, 31
fishermen lost their lives as a result of
injuries from clashes between the
traditional boats and trawlers at sea. There
have been several other such incidents in
regions such as Langkat, Asahan and
Belawan. However, there are no official
records of these incidents.
As an organization founded by fishermen,
SNSU actively promotes the interests of
traditional fishermen by putting pressure
on the Provincial Governor of North
Sumatra, the President of Indonesia, and
agencies such as the Office of the Attorney
General, the District Military Office of
Bukit Barisan, Lantamal I Belawan,
Provincial Fishery Department in North
Sumatra, and District Officers (Muspika) in
coastal areas, etc. 
A number of activities have been
undertaken to draw attention to the
problems of traditional fishermen, such as
delegations, demonstrations,
presentations, and even the direct arrests
of trawlers. 
The SNSU aims to create unity among
fishers in North Sumatra and to support
them in their struggle for social, cultural,
economic and legal justice, as citizens of
Indonesia. More specifically, it aims to:
• develop economic activities for all
members through the formation of
fishermen’s co-operatives; 
• improve the social welfare of all
members;
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• train members through
educational activities;
• defend the interests of members
through advocacy; and
• establish fishermen’s groups in
every district along the coast of
North Sumatra.
In order to achieve these objectives,SNSU has developed variousprogrammes. These can be broadly
classified as Advocacy, Community
Economic Development, Human
Resource Development, and Networking.
The present era of reform in Indonesia,
where freedom to organize and express
one’s views is part of the democratization
process, has provided a good opportunity
for traditional fishermen to articulate their
concerns. It is hoped that the
establishment of the Ocean Exploration
and Fishery Department will promote the
welfare of traditional fishermen in
Indonesia and particularly in North
Sumatra. Hopefully, the mistakes of the
past, when the traditional fishery sector
was ignored, will not be repeated.
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Seafood industry
Corporate capers
A takeover bid by a Canadian seafood company 
underlines the need for clear public policy on critical industries
In recent years, the fishing industry ofNewfoundland and Labrador,Canada’s newest and most easterly
province and one that has a traditional
dependence on the fishery, has seen
market forces being relegated to second
place by the organized strength of coastal
people.
It all began with a bid by a new
consortium called NEOS Seafoods Inc. for
a hostile takeover of Newfoundland’s
(and indeed North America’s) largest
seafood company, Fishery Products
International (FPI), a publicly traded
company.
Eighty per cent of the equity of NEOS is
divided equally between the company’s
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia partners,
the seafood companies known as the
Barry Group and Clearwater Fine Foods
respectively, and the remainder 20 per
cent is owned by the Icelandic seafood
trading company, Icelandic Freezing
Plants Corp.
FPI is a seafood company which was
formed in the mid-1980s out of the ashes
of a virtually bankrupt Newfoundland
deep-sea fishing sector. To avoid massive
job loss, the federal and provincial
governments of the day poured hundreds
of millions of dollars into the restructuring
of the deep-sea sector.
A number of virtually bankrupt
companies operating in Newfoundland
were combined into FPI, a company in
which both levels of government took an
equity position. Provincial legislation
included a requirement that the company
maintain its head office within the
province and have majority of
Newfoundlanders on the Board of
Directors. In addition, the legislation
contained a share restriction that limited
to 15 per cent the proportion of FPI shares
that could be held by any one individual
or association of individuals acting in
consort.
After highly profitable years in the mid- to
late-1980s, FPI bought out the government
shares, privatized the company and
restructured itself into a company traded
on the stock exchange. It obtained raw
material both from offshore company
ITQs and by buying from independent
inshore and midshore harvesters.
The collapse of the key groundfish stocks
in Atlantic Canada by 1992-93 created
another crisis for FPI, which lost 95 per cent
of its groundfish allocations. Once again,
the company went back to the drawing
board, shifting its emphasis to
international seafood trading.
The company made this transition
successfully, enjoying modest
profitability by 1998, and in the acquisitive
mindset of the market, was seen to be
“ripe for the picking”. The first potential
cherry picker was NEOS, a company
created for that very purpose. On 5
November 1999, NEOS offered Can$9 a
share for FPI shares, up from the then
current rate of about Can$7.20. But it was
a highly conditional offer, contingent
upon, among other things, removal of the
legislated 15 per cent share restriction as
well as a similar provision in the FPI
byelaws, and also upon the
presumptuous condition that there be no
review of the matter by Canada’s
Competition Bureau.
More concentration
This latter condition was significant in
that the takeover, if successful, would lead
to an extremely high degree of
concentration in the Newfoundland
fishery, one that had set off alarm bells
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among Newfoundland’s 10,000-strong
inshore/midshore fish harvesting sector,
as well as among fish plant workers.
The Fish, Food and Allied Workers(FFAW/CAW) Union representsboth fish harvesters and fish
processing plant workers, including about
3,000 plant workers and 300 trawlermen
employed by FPI. Even during the darkest
years of the groundfish crisis of the 1990s,
the union had negotiated wage increases
for plant workers in every year but one,
and labour relations with FPI were positive
and constructive.
Normally, shareholders could not care
less what a union thinks about a share
offering, but the 15 per cent share
restriction made the takeover bid a
political issue as well as a financial one.
Without the approval of the
Newfoundland and Labrador
governments, the bid would fail.
The governments’ position was that they
would be convinced to lift the legislation
only if the people of the province were
convinced. Suddenly, the union was in a
highly influential position, as were the
municipal councils in towns with FPI
plants.
FFAW/CAW were first off the mark in
developing a position on the takeover bid.
A week after the bid was announced, the
union executive board, together with the
elected union leadership of the FPI plants
and CAW National President, Buzz
Hargrove, met first with the NEOS
principals then with FPI management. The
union then arrived at a position and
moved to an adjoining meeting room to
advise a press conference that it would be
asking the provincial government to
maintain the 15 per cent share restriction.
The union’s position was based on three
main considerations:
1. The financial vulnerability of FPI arising
from the conversion of Can$150-Can$200
million of shareholder equity into debt, as
proposed by NEOS.
2. The high level of corporate
concentration that would have resulted in
the fishery in Newfoundland and
Labrador, particularly detrimental to fish
harvesters as a result of significant
lessening of competitive forces in the
buying of raw material.
3. The positive labour relations history
between FPI and its unionized workforce,
in contrast with the pronounced,
high-profile, anti-union background of at
least one of the partners in NEOS.
Election-style campaign
NEOS expressed disappointment in the
union’s position, and immediately
launched an election-style campaign,
including highly publicized visits by the
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NEOS principals to several towns in which
FPI operates. NEOS announced plans to
rebuild FPI’s oldest plant, at a cost of
Can$10 million, and also promised new
facilities in two additional locations. It
also promised year-round work in plants
which had been limited to seasonal work
by raw material constraints.
The reaction of the workforce andthe communities was one ofscepticism. Plant workers turned
out in large numbers at membership
meetings to oppose the NEOS plan. One by
one, municipal councils in towns with FPI
plants followed the union’s lead in
opposing the lifting of the share
restrictions. The social democratic New
Democratic Party had come out early
opposing the takeover, and once it became
clear that public opinion was strongly
against the takeover, the opposition
Progressive Conservative party took a
similar position.
Having promised initially to respect
public opinion, the provincial
government advised NEOS, on 7 December
1999, that it would not lift the share
restriction. The next day, NEOS withdrew
its bid, less than five weeks after it had first
been announced.
Fundamentally, the NEOS bid failed
because its proponents had developed
their plan in isolation from organized
labour, and failed to convince anyone that
their plan would enhance and strengthen
the Newfoundland and Labrador fishing
industry generally and the prospects and
job security of FPI employees and fish
harvesters in particular. The whole
experience underlines the importance of
government legislation to stabilize and set
ground rules for public policy for critical
industries.
Pressure to remove the restrictions will
continue, from FPI’s management and
Board of Directors as well, because the
financial world prefers that only its rules
apply. But, as we enter the new century,
the same vigilance that FPI workers, fish
harvesters and their union displayed
through five crucial weeks at the end of
the 20th century will be needed even more
as workers respond to global pressures for
unrestricted and untrammelled corporate
rights.
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Fisheries management 
Only partnerships work
The experience of Barbados throws light on fisheries 
management plans, and not just for Small Island Developing States
The need to introduce FisheryManagement Plans (FMPs) was firstappreciated by eastern Caribbean
fisheries authorities in the early 1980s.
Fisheries are important socially and
culturally, if not economically, in these
Small Island Developing States (SIDS). 
The fishing industry of Barbados, the most
eastern of the islands in the Lesser Antilles
chain, is small-scale and based largely on
the migratory pelagic fishes such as flying
fish, dolphin, tunas and billfish that
traverse its Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ). Due to their movement during some
parts of their life cycles, these fish
resources are shared with several other
marine jurisdictions and countries.
The Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) and the CARICOM Fisheries Resource
Assessment and Management
Programme (CFRAMP) assisted in
producing a draft FMP for Barbados to
meet the requirements of a 1993 Fisheries
Act which took the provisions of the Law
of the Sea into account. The Fisheries Act
requires the Chief Fisheries Officer to
develop fishery-specific FMPs and keep
them under review. According to the Act,
each fishery plan must include:
• The present state of fishery
exploitation
• Management and development
objectives
• Management and development
measures and policies
• Statistical information
requirements
• Specifications of licensing and
limitations to fishing
The work of developing the initial draft
plans was confined largely to fisheries
consultants and the fisheries officers of the
Fisheries Division in the Ministry of
Agriculture. However, the Fisheries Act
requires that the Minister appoint a
Fisheries Advisory Committee to advise
him on the development and
management of fisheries. 
In the absence of functioning fisherfolk
organizations at the time, members from
the fishing industry were selected on the
basis of their personal expertise through
an informal system of peer
recommendations and shortlisting. The
appointed members of the Fisheries
Advisory Committee were the Chief
Fisheries Officer as Chairman, an offshore
fisherman, an inshore fisherman, a
boatowner, a fish processor, a fisheries
consultant, and the Deputy Director of the
Coastal Zone Management Unit. Early in
1996, the newly formed Fisheries
Advisory Committee faced the task of
completing the FMP through consultation
as promoted in the Fisheries Act. 
The Committee anticipated that several
months of private and public meetings
would be required to re-formulate the
draft FMP. The Act recommended that the
fishing industry and other stakeholders
have a meaningful say in determining the
content of the FMP. These are the people
who will be most affected by the plan,
whether it is successful or not. It is widely
recognized that FMPs will succeed only if
the fishing industry is an integral part of
plan formulation, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation. 
Legal guidance
Clearly defining the task and then tackling
it methodically was important. The law
gave guidance on content, and the
Fisheries Advisory Committee decided on
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a sequence of steps, each with feedback
and a schedule, as follows:
1. Fisheries Division formulates the
draft FMP
2. Fishery Advisory Committee
(FAC) appraises the draft FMP
3. Fishing industry and other
stakeholders review the draft FMP
in public
4. Minister approves the final draft
FMP (after several reviews and
revisions)
5. Fisheries Division and fishing in-
dustry implement and monitor the
FMP
6. Stakeholders and Fisheries
Division evaluate and improve the
FMP
The circulation of the Fisheries Advisory
Committee’s draft FMP for public review
stimulated active and constructive
participation. We intentionally went
beyond the fishing industry, since the
benefits from managing fishery resources
must be shared among the general public.
All taxpayers share the costs of fisheries
management, and there are many
interactions with stakeholders in other
sectors of the economy such as tourism
and agriculture. Therefore, special
attention was paid to coastal zone issues
and inter-sectoral linkages.
Public meetings were held in both central
and community locations. Although the
Fisheries Division took the lead, members
of the FAC also attended the site meetings.
Copies of the draft Plan were distributed,
and the public at large informed that
written comments were welcome.
However, more emphasis was placed on
receiving the oral comments of fisherfolk
at the informal field meetings. All issues
affecting the fishing industry were open
for discussion, whether in the draft Plan
or not, so that the stakeholders set the
agenda for the review. From the public
review process, we got additional ideas to
incorporate into the Plan. We were told,
often in no uncertain terms, which were
the priority areas and burning issues. 
The Fisheries Division and Fisheries
Advisory Committee revised the FMP to
include the recommendations of
stakeholders, whether they agreed with
the government or not. The fact that the
FMP was now the people’s plan made it
more acceptable to the political
directorate. 
Legal regulations
When legal regulations are drafted on the
basis of the plan, Ministers must feel
confident that the fishery management
measures will be supported by the
ordinary man in the street. It was easy to
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persuade the fisheries Minister to approve
the plan for implementation as required
by law. 
The first FMP for Barbados wasapproved in 1997, and theregulations to give effect to the
agreed upon management measures
became law in 1998. Meanwhile, the
Fisheries Division started a public
education programme to remind
stakeholders and the public about the
benefits of fisheries management and the
important role individuals and groups
can play to help it succeed. The majority
of participants in the fishing industry and
the public are unfamiliar with fisheries
management planning. The first plan was
intended primarily as a communication
and education document. In this respect,
it has been quite successful.
The legally required information for each
of the eight fisheries to be managed was
put in a format that was easy to follow
even if one knew little about the fishing
industry. The first half of the plan
document gave a general overview of the
fishing industry so the reader could place
the plans into context. Issues regarding
fisheries development, which is of prime
interest to people in the industry, potential
investors, banks and donor agencies were
placed in a separate section. Each
fishery-specific plan follows a common
layout and minimizes the use of technical
or scientific language. For each, there is
also an implementation plan that seeks to
address the main issues confronting the
particular fishery. This layout is intended
to facilitate quick access to the essential
information. A glossary is appended to
explain some essential technical terms and
management concepts. 
The fishery-specific plan sections are:
Target Species; Catch and Effort Trend;
By-catch; Regulatory History; Ecology;
Management Policies and Objectives;
Description of Fishery; Selected
Management Approaches; Management
Unit Development Constraints; Resource
Status; and Development Opportunities.
The plan has also been effective in having
its contents translated into legal
regulations intended to manage the
fishery. However, compliance with the
regulations has been mixed largely due to
the inability of the small staff of the
Fisheries Division to follow up with the
technical support required to establish
some of the fishing gear measures for
responsible fishing. 
Collaborations
The Fisheries Division has been
vigorously promoting and facilitating the
formation of fisherfolk organizations in
order to improve participation and
collaboration in the process. Even though
fisherfolk organize themselves mainly for
income-generating development, rather
than fisheries resource conservation or
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management, the collective action is
mutually beneficial for information
exchange and exploring shared interests
with other stakeholders and government.
The planning process recentlyintroduced in Barbados hasprovided a variety of lessons that
may apply elsewhere. First, the fishing
industry is not familiar with fishery
management issues and techniques.
Therefore, it can not be assumed that
Fisheries Advisory Committee members
drawn from the industry, or the public, are
in a position to contribute to the scientific
and very technical aspects of the plan.
However, their contributions on other
aspects are invaluable.
The planning process brought to the fore
the wide array of responsibilities of the
Fisheries Division, and the urgent need for
attention to many of these issues. It,
therefore, underscored the limited
institutional capacity of the Fisheries
Division to address these issues
expeditiously with its currently scarce
resources (human, physical and financial).
The selected approach starts with a
rational framework that describes, in
simple terms, what is known and
generally agreed upon by the
management stakeholders. It identifies
desired end points and the approaches to
getting there, based on the best available
and shared information. 
In this manner, the foundation is laid for
proceeding with management actions that
are reasonable and generally acceptable
even before there is a well-established
scientific basis for them. These types of
approaches, which rely less on large
quantities of scientific information, and
more on negotiated objectives derived
from modest science and shared
perspectives, are perhaps better suited to
small-scale fisheries management, given
the limited capacities of most fisheries
management units in SIDS. 
The Barbadian approach is precautionary
in first setting up the management policies
and objectives with simple, achievable
steps to meet them. It is not based upon
conducting stock assessment and detailed
scientific research as an essential
prerequisite. It, therefore, includes
obtaining scientific information as
management proceeds. 
At public meetings, the industry tended to
focus more on the problems associated
with infrastructure and economic
development, than on management or
conservation issues. In preparing the FMP
to meet local needs and expectations, it
was decided to explicitly include fisheries
development. 
The close and complementary link
between management and development
was thought to be an important
perspective in the context of promoting
sustainable resource use in a SIDS. People
and politicians in developing countries
expect management to include both
conservation and development. However,
the bias towards capital development is
based on an implicit assumption of
continued resource availability. This can
be a dangerously incorrect assumption.
These lessons reiterate the need for
increased and continuous information
exchange amongst stakeholders in the
fisheries management process. This is
necessary to bring about more informed,
meaningful and effective participation by
the fishing industry. It will also strengthen
the capability of the State to manage the
fisheries successfully through
collaboration and co-operation, rather
than command and control. Indeed,
exchange of information between the
fishing industry and fishery managers is
one of the most critical dimensions of
fisheries planning. This is especially so in
countries like ours unable to engage in
elaborate fisheries research. Fisheries
authorities must recognize that they need
to form partnerships with the people in
the fishing industry, whether the process
is called co-management, community-
based management or something else.
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Co-management
The way forward
Inshore harvesters throughout Atlantic Canada are gradually extending 
their influence over fisheries management through co-management processes
Creating New Wealth from the Sea,published by the CanadianCouncil of Professional Fish
Harvesters (CCPFH) in June 1996, included
the following statement: “We support the
concept of co-management with industry
shouldering more management
responsibilities together with
government.”
Since the report was published, however,
the idea of co-management has become
increasingly confused and controversial,
and industry organizations now express
views on the topic ranging from cautious
interest to outright distrust. 
Many harvester leaders see
co-management as yet another example of
government talking about grass-roots
participation and consultation, but doing
the opposite. They point to top-down
decision-making on issues like fleet
reduction, licence fees, small craft
harbours, downloading of surveillance
and enforcement costs, and resource
allocations. The most serious criticism is
that the co-management policy of the
Department of Fishery Operations (DFO) is
just a smokescreen to advance the
governments agenda to privatize fish
resources and force everyone on to
individual transferable quotas (ITQs).
The fact that the DFO has targeted
specialized corporate or mid-shore fleets
for their initial ‘partnering’ agreements
(on, for example, offshore scallops, Pacific
halibut, groundfish mobile gear, snow
crab, etc.) has also made the multi-species
inshore sector suspicious of the
government’s motives.
Against this background of mistrust and
controversy, the DFO asked the Council to
consult with its member organizations
about guidelines for co-management in
the multi-licence inshore fishery. The
project provided an opportunity for the
Council to look closely at some of the
many fisheries management activities that
inshore harvesters in Atlantic Canada and
Québec have initiated in their local areas,
and for harvesters to discuss and debate
wider policy issues related to
co-management. What follows is a brief
summary of the Council’s report.
The DFO’s co-management policy has been
in place since 1995. It involves two
principal elements which impact on the
multi-licence inshore sector: Integrated
Fisheries Management Plans (IFMPs) and
partnering arrangements. IFMPs are
gradually being introduced by the DFO for
each individual fishery. They are built on
the established system of advisory
committees and fisheries management
plans, but are intended to involve wider
consultations with licence holders and
other stakeholders. They are also
supposed to pull together the activities of
all the DFO sectors—Resource
Management, Science, Conservation and
Protection, Policy and Economics, etc.—
in one planning process.
Fisheries management ‘partnering
arrangements’ involve negotiated
agreements between the DFO and industry
groups to share regulatory,
administrative and other responsibilities.
At present, such arrangements are set up
as joint project agreements (JPAs) which
define the administrative and financial
aspects of the legal contracts between the
partners. 
Micromanagement
In most cases, industry is expected to take
on some responsibilities and costs for the
day-to-day micromanagement of the
fishery that were previously carried on by
the DFO, in return for greater security of
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access to resources and expanded control
over their own fishing operations. 
A proposed new Fisheries Actcontains legislative mechanismsfor more comprehensive and
longer term transfers of management
authority, subject to the Minister’s
continuing responsibility for
conservation, through formal fisheries
management agreements.
Multi-licensed inshore harvesters
throughout Atlantic Canada and Québec
have consistently raised concerns about
co-management throughout the
consultations leading up to the Council’s
report. These concerns can be
summarized as follows:
1. The need for multi-species approaches
to fisheries management: From a
conservation perspective, as well as in
terms of the way they conduct their
multi-species enterprises, inshore
harvesters want to see mechanisms that
promote integrated planning and
regulation of all fishing activities in a
given area.
2. Privatization of the resource:
Co-management is seen by many
harvesters as part of a continuing push by
the DFO for privatization of fish resources
and of the management system,
particularly through the implementation
of ITQ regimes.
3. Concerns about ‘economic viability’: In
contrast to the DFO’s narrow approach to
enterprise viability based on
single-species fisheries, multi-licence
harvesters favour a comprehensive
accounting system that would also look at
the viability of fleets and fishing
communities.
4. Cost downloading: Harvester groups
are concerned that the continued
downloading of costs through higher
licence fees, dockside monitoring costs,
etc. is having negative impacts on
enterprise viability in the inshore,
multi-licence fleets.
5. Ineffective capacity reduction:
Harvesters want to see more industry
control over capacity reduction and
programmes that are sensitive to local
conditions and will produce optimal gains
in terms of overall fleet viability.
Inshore harvesters would like to see
provisions in the new Fisheries Act to
define clear roles and responsibilities for
broad-based organizations with regard to
co-management in their sectors. They also
want the Act to define clearly who can be
partners in a transparent process of
negotiation for fisheries management
agreements.
Exciting projects
The report of the Council describes a
number of exciting local projects where
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harvesters, with or without the support of
the DFO, are taking the initiative to build
new fisheries management systems that
work effectively at the local level. 
In Newfoundland’s EastportPeninsula, harvesters are doing theirown lobster stock assessment
research, after setting up a new system to
enforce minimum size limits. In Gulf
Nova Scotia, groups have come together
to design a comprehensive capacity
reduction strategy. On Digby Neck and in
Shelburne County, Nova Scotia, local
harvester groups are managing their
groundfish allocations through
innovative community-based
management systems. 
All around the Atlantic region, local
harvester groups are adapting new
approaches to research and education to
improve recruitment levels in the
critically important lobster fishery. 
These current activities are clearly part of
a long tradition of multi-licence harvester
groups taking responsibility for the
management of their industry. 
While the DFO has only recently embraced
the concept of co-management, harvester
groups have long pushed for genuine
partnership with government whereby
the knowledge, competencies and
economic interests of harvesters are fully
recognized, and where they have a
meaningful say in the decisions that shape
their working lives.
The Council’s Board of Directors is
circulating the co-management report to
stimulate discussion among harvesters
and their organizations and within
government. While it is not able to take a
clear policy stance until its member
organizations have fully considered the
issues, the Council is putting forward for
discussion the following three action steps
to advance co-management in the
multi-licence inshore sector:
1. Co-Management Advisory Councils:
The DFO and the legitimate harvester
organizations could work together to
design and put in place representative
advisory councils to act as consultation,
planning and co-ordinating bodies for the
continuing elaboration of co-management
in multi-licence inshore fisheries. The
councils would generate advice and seek
industry consensus in areas such as
harvester registration systems,
professionalization, long-term fleet
planning, community-based
management, and locally based
co-management projects.
Harvester communities
In determining their coverage by area,
such councils would be built from the
ground up and shaped by harvester
communities who choose to group
together. DFO staff and harvester
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representatives would work together
through the councils on fisheries
management plans, local co-management
projects and partnering agreements.
2. Regional Working Groups on Capacity
Building: The DFO and the established
harvester organizations in each region
would work together to help harvester
groups to participate in co-management
for multi-licence inshore fisheries. Among
the issues to be addressed would be: the
need for stronger, better financed
harvester organizations; education and
training programmes to strengthen local
knowledge and skills; better networking
among local and regional harvester
groups; and ongoing evaluation of
regional and local co-management
initiatives to support the sharing of
experience, knowledge and skills.
3. A Co-management Investment Fund:
These regional working groups could
undertake to set up funds for local
harvester groups to support the
development of co-management projects.
Harvester groups often have excellent
ideas for ways to improve their fisheries
but have difficulty getting the start-up
money. An investment fund should be
self-sustaining by investing in activities
that can pay for themselves over the
medium term.
It is hoped that the CCPFH discussion
paper on co-management for
multi-licence inshore fisheries will
contribute to a well-informed debate on
fisheries management issues and to better
understanding among government and
the harvester community. 
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Fisheries management
Fishing for a language
The experience of the Ngäi Tahu Maori tribe could be a model 
on how to implement a common language for fisheries management plan 
At a certain level, everyoneinvolved in fisheries managementwould agree that our aim is to
manage the fisheries resources
sustainably. Divergence on what this
means rapidly emerges in any discussion
on the term ‘sustainability’. The
divergence results from the lack of a
common language with which to
approach fisheries management. 
This is not to say there is a lack of fisheries
language. On the contrary, the field of
fisheries management is renowned for its
substantive and often peculiar
terminology. Examples of ‘resource rents’,
‘TACs’, ‘carrying capacity’ and ‘fishing
down’ are just a few that readily come to
mind. These terms are widely bandied
about by those involved in fisheries
management. But what do they really
mean and how often has the lack of
common understanding of the language
of fisheries management led to disastrous
results for both the fisheries and the
people who rely on this natural resource?
This article will briefly clarify some of the
language used in the context of customary
fisheries management in New Zealand. It
will then go on to sketch the path taken by
New Zealand in grappling with the
language of Mäori fisheries, in the context
of a rights-based fisheries management
system. The bulk of the article will then
describe how the Mäori tribe, Ngäi Tahu,
implemented their customary fisheries
management system and how they
communicated the language of this
system to the rest of New Zealand.
An oft-misunderstood concept is that of
property and how it relates to the fisheries
resource for indigenous peoples. Implicit
in much of the discourse surrounding
property rights and fisheries is the idea
that the fisheries resource is an asset that
can be owned, divided and transferred.
Linked to this presupposition is the idea
of the State being the owner of the asset on
behalf of the public.
The indigenous people of New Zealand
(Mäoris) have a different interpretation on
the relationship between people and the
fisheries resource. It is widely held by
Mäoris that people do not, and can not,
own the fisheries resource; rather, it is the
responsibility of people to steward the
resource. They have the authority,
confirmed by genealogy, to define
boundaries, to determine seasons and
methods and any other measure to
manage the fishing. Thus, the access to the
fisheries that Mäoris had exercised over
generations was a right undertaken in
intimate relationship with their
responsibilities to look after the resource. 
With these beliefs guiding their access and
use of the fisheries resource, Mäoris were
understandably aghast at the action of the
State in introducing a Quota Management
System (QMS) over the fisheries resources
in New Zealand’s EEZ. 
In response, Mäoris then challenged the
very presupposition of patrimony being
adopted by the State, and launched the
successful litigation that then led to the
settlement of the Mäori fisheries claims.
A basis of the litigation was that the State
did not have the patrimonial right to
allocate the fisheries resources as an asset.
The State did not have this right, as there
was a pre-existing relationship of rights
and responsibilities held by Mäoris for the
fisheries resource.
Mäori aims
The aim of Mäoris, throughout the years
of litigation, negotiation and now
implementation of fisheries settlement
N
ew
 
Ze
al
a
n
d 
18 SAMUDRA APRIL 2000
legislation, is to have sovereignty over
their rights and responsibilities — that is,
to determine for themselves how to
manage their access to the fisheries
resource and how best to fulfil their
responsibilities in looking after the
resource. 
Legislation governing fisheriesmanagement in New Zealand had,since the late 1800s, made reference
to the “Mäori fishing right”. The
legislative references did not define or
articulate what this right was in the
context of the fisheries management of the
day; rather, the references maintained
recognition of the relationship of rights
and responsibilities held by Mäoris for the
fisheries resource.
It was to these legislative references that
Mäoris turned when faced with the
introduction of a QMS in the mid-1980s.
The State, by acting on the presupposition
that they could allocate the fisheries
resource as an asset, had contravened
legislation, and directly affected the
recognized Mäori fishing right. 
The language understood by the State had
run headlong into the language
understood by Mäoris. Mäoris resorted to
litigation to put their message across,
which resulted in the Court directing the
parties, Mäoris and the State, to negotiate
a way through the impasse. The challenge
facing the parties was how to reach a
common language with which the
intentions of both parties could be
achieved. In more detail, the key question
facing the parties was how did the Mäori
fishing right work in the context of the
current fisheries management system in
New Zealand? It was at this juncture that
a crucial decision was made. The Mäori
fishing right was separated into
commercial and customary
non-commercial facets. The commercial
aspect of the right could then be aligned
with the language of property rights as
understood by the State, that is, the
fisheries resource could be regarded as an
asset. The customary non-commercial
aspects of the right would need to be
further defined and articulated by
legislation to enable a common language
and understanding.
With the decision to separate the Mäori
fishing right in this manner, the path was
cleared for subsequent negotiations to
proceed, and the two settlements of 1989
and 1992 to be reached. The 1989
legislation was an interim settlement that
provided for 10 per cent of quota currently
in the QMS and NZ$10 million in cash to be
transferred to Mäoris. 
Cultural reasons
This legislation also provided for areas to
be established that had customarily been
of special significance to a tribe as a source
of food or for spiritual or cultural reasons.
A management committee would then be
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established to give advice to the Minister
of Fisheries on how best to manage the
fisheries in the area. 
The 1992 legislation built on theearlier interim settlement andprovided additional assets to
Mäoris of a 50 per cent share of the fishing
company, Sealord Ltd., and guaranteed 20
per cent of the quota of future species to
the QMS. Provision was also made for
regulations to be established that would
confirm the customary non-commercial
rights of Mäori.
Progress on implementation of the
commercial aspect of the fisheries
settlements was rapidly undertaken, and,
today, Mäori interests control (through
ownership, lease or pre-emptive right)
approximately 57 per cent of the
commercial quota in the New Zealand
QMS. Final delivery of this control to
individual tribes has yet to be completed,
with internal discrepancies amongst
Mäoris as how best to allocate the assets.
Progress on implementation of legislation
defining the customary non-commercial
aspect of the fisheries settlements was less
rapid, and it was six years before
legislation was promulgated for
customary fisheries in the South Island of
New Zealand. In 1998, the Fisheries
(South Island Customary Fishing)
Regulations were passed. These
regulations were soon followed by similar
legislation for the North Island of New
Zealand. 
Ngäi Tahu, the largest Mäori tribe in the
South Island, which has one of the longest
coastline, is a key player in the
management of fisheries in New Zealand.
The initiatives that Ngäi Tahu has taken in
the last few years with customary fisheries
management are, without doubt,
vanguard measures for the rest of the
world to consider.
It was Ngäi Tahu, along with the eight
tribes at the top of the South Island, who
initiated a final round of negotiations with
the State to agree on a set of regulations
governing customary fisheries. The
national negotiations had grown stale
after years of mismatching language
between the State and Mäori negotiators.
The negotiations between the State and
the tribes of the South Island were,
however, successful, and, in 1998, a set of
regulations were promulgated. These
regulations defined and articulated the
customary non-commercial fishing right
within the context of the New Zealand
fisheries management system.
Regulations alone, however, are not
enough to communicate a common
language to all people involved in
fisheries management. Ngäi Tahu
decided to take a strategic approach to the
challenge of communicating their
understanding and language of
customary fisheries management. The
underlying philosophy or mission
statement for all Ngäi Tahu customary
fisheries management is “to secure and
develop Ngäi Tahu customary fishing
rights within a context of sustainable use
of the fisheries resource, empowering
Ngäi Tahu whänui to take up their
responsibilities in fisheries management”.
Ngäi Tahu then identified six key areas to
be their strategic framework for
customary fisheries management:
organisation; research; information
management; education and
empowerment; external relations; and
compliance and monitoring. 
The aim of the customary fisheries
organisation is to have in place the
necessary legislation, structures,
processes and resources to be responsive
to the needs of the tribe and to achieve the
mission statement. This work area is the
foundation for all other work undertaken
in customary fisheries management. 
A customary fisheries management team
was developed within Ngäi Tahu
Development Corporation. The team
comprises nine staff positions, six of
which are funded by contracts of service
with the Ministry of Fisheries. The
remaining three positions are funded by
Ngäi Tahu internal funds. This is a crucial
aspect of the robust management
structure. 
Contracts of service
Without the capability to manage
contracts, it is doubtful whether the
government department would have
entered into the contracts of service.
Equally, the ability to attract contracts of
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service provides the necessary motivation
for continuing internal funding. These
contracts are a new way for indigenous
people to achieve the outcomes they want.
The key role of the nine-person teamis to support the role of TangataTiaki. Tangata Tiaki are those
people with recognized authority under
the customary fishing regulations to
manage the customary fisheries. 
The aim of the research work component
is to establish priorities for research,
identify and support key human
resources within Ngäi Tahu for
undertaking research, and support
projects that address Ngäi Tahu research
priorities. Ngäi Tahu are well aware that
information is influence, and the more
information they can hold on the fisheries
resource, the better the Tangata Tiaki can
manage the resource.
Directly linked to undertaking research
for information on fisheries is the ability
to hold and manage this information. The
aim of the information management
component is to establish a user-friendly
and secure Geographic Information
System (GIS) that will support and inform
tribal development in customary fisheries
management. 
Spatial mapping technology is eminently
suitable for the nature of customary
fisheries management, with the highly
visual characteristics of GIS appealing to
tangata whenua.
Ngäi Tahu commissioned a New
Zealand-based GIS company, whose
Managing Director is of Ngäi Tahu
descent, to design a GIS specifically for the
needs of customary fisheries
management. The result is a user-friendly
system that tracks the activities of the
customary fishers, the Tangata Tiaki and
any other people connected to the
customary fisheries management system.
The GIS was designed to be extensible and
it is anticipated that, in time, the system
will be utilized by other fisheries
managers.
The most effective message is one that is
well understood. The aim of the work area
of education and empowerment is to
widely promote the role and function of
customary fisheries management,
empowering and assisting Mäoris to
identify and pursue their aspirations. This
area has been a priority of the customary
fisheries management system, as it is
believed that if people understand the
principles and necessity for customary
fisheries management, they will support
management initiatives. 
Sense of ownership
It has been important to encourage a sense
of ownership by Mäoris for their
customary fisheries. Educate and
empower Mäoris first, then broaden the
N
ew
 
Ze
al
a
n
d 
22 SAMUDRA APRIL 2000
focus to educate others to support
customary fisheries management. In other
words, ensure the language is well
understood at home and then, together,
take it to others to understand.
The initiatives undertaken to spreadthe common language ofcustomary fisheries management
have ranged from production of resources
(video, booklet, stickers and T-shirts) to
training programmes. A comprehensive
two-day training course is available for all
the established Tangata Tiaki. The
common characteristics of all the
initiatives have been their simplicity,
creativity and fun. That has allowed the
information to be easily understood. 
The message of Ngäi Tahu needs
continual promotion and discussion to be
fully understood as a language of fisheries
management. The aim of the external
relations component is for Ngäi Tahu to be
proactive in developing their external
relations, ensuring their strategic
objectives are reflected in the work
programmes of all fisheries management
groups and agencies. In some cases,
relationship agreements are developed
between the parties as a way of confirming
that the common language is understood.
Ngäi Tahu has found that strategic
alliances with other stakeholders are a
path to smoother relations and successful
outcomes.
The aim of the compliance component is
to encourage voluntary compliance with
fisheries laws, and to monitor the
effectiveness of customary fisheries
management. Ngäi Tahu is well aware
that the language of customary fisheries
management is constantly evolving. In
order to ensure adherence with the
current understanding of the language
and monitor any changes, Ngäi Tahu took
up a compliance contract with the
government. 
It was a leap of faith for the government
and Ngäi Tahu to enter into the
compliance contract. Yet it was a leap that
has been well rewarded. This contract
enabled the employment of the five Kai
Arahi, and triggered the formation of the
entire customary fisheries team. It has also
given visible and tangible proof to all
watching that the language of customary
fisheries management can be commonly
understood regardless of your cultural
background.
It is this proof that makes the example of
Ngäi Tahu customary fisheries
management a model for others to study
and possibly follow. This model
demonstrates how a language
incomprehensible to many, a language of
spiritual beliefs and connections to the
natural environment, was interpreted,
articulated and defined in such a way that
people could understand it. That is not to
say that each individual understands the
language of customary fisheries
management in the same way. After all,
every individual reads the world in a
unique way that is bound by her/his
beliefs. Yet, the language of Ngäi Tahu
and customary fisheries management has
been communicated well enough for
people to understand and support the
common intention.
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Fisheries management
Shepherding the seas 
The International Operations Group of Fisheries Western Australia 
offers expert advice on issues of monitoring, control and surveillance 
The modern environment offisheries and marine managementis complex and demanding.
High-seas management, raised levels of
technology, and state-of-the-art vessel
operations all ensure that the monitoring,
control and surveillance (MCS) of our
precious marine resources needs to be of
the highest standard.
The International Operations Group of
Fisheries Western Australia is a dedicated
and experienced team of professional
compliance officers who undertake a wide
variety of demanding tasks on behalf of
the Australian Fisheries Management
Authority (AFMA), Australia’s Federal
fisheries management agency. Group
members possess a diverse range of skills
and qualifications in the areas of fisheries
management, MCS of capture fisheries,
environmental management, education
and enforcement techniques. All members
have Maritime Masters qualifications of
varying levels.
The group has been operating
continuously since 1979. Officers
regularly operate in such diverse regions
as the warm waters of the tropics and the
less hospitable waters of the
sub-Antarctic. Patrols cover the
Australian 200-nautical mile Fishing Zone
(AFZ) adjacent to Western Australia, and
the remote offshore territories of
Christmas Island and Cocos Islands, as
well as the Antarctic regions of Heard and
McDonald Islands. They conduct aerial
and surface patrols on vessels and aircraft
supplied by the Royal Australian Navy,
Coastwatch and the Royal Australian Air
Force, as well as private charter vessels.
In-port inspection of foreign and domestic
fishing vessels is also a primary task
undertaken by the group. These
inspections are conducted in ports
throughout Australia, covering the local
tuna longline operators as well as the
large-scale Japanese tuna fleet. Licence
and logbook checks, pre- and post-fishing
briefings, and freezer volumetric
inspections are routine. More than 250
vessels are checked annually. In the 1980s,
licensed Taiwanese pair-trawlers were
also inspected on a regular basis in the
northwest port of Broome.
International Operations staff operate in
harsh and difficult conditions, using
comprehensive occupational health and
safety guidelines. The group has
developed specialized equipment and
procedures to operate effectively in
extremely low temperature freezers
aboard fishing vessels.
International Operations Officers have
extensive experience in the volumetric
estimation of fish catches in freezer holds.
Their methodology allows for auditing of
vessel catches that are subject to quota
restrictions in situ, without compromising
the quality of the product by removing it
from the freezer. Monitoring of quotas can
often be difficult in any fishery and, in
many circumstances, can be the weak link
in the chain when considering accuracy in
the measurement of fishing effort.
Volumetric surveys are ideal where the
unload can not be supervised or
measured, as is the situation with visiting
Japanese tuna vessels.
Illegal fishing
Officers have been kept extremely busy
since the late 1980s, with a constant influx
of Indonesian fishermen illegally fishing
within the AFZ. A Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) exists between the
Indonesian Government and the
Australian Government to allow
traditional Indonesian fishermen to fish
within the AFZ in an area off the northwest
A
us
tr
a
lia
 
24 SAMUDRA APRIL 2000
coast. Nearly all the Indonesian vessels
apprehended have been fishing outside
this allocated area. The main target species
for these vessels are trochus, trepang and
shark (for fins).
In addition to the surveillance in thenorthern waters adjacent to themainland, regular patrols are
conducted to Christmas Island and the
Cocos Islands in the northern Indian
Ocean. As territories of Australia, each has
a 200-nautical mile fishing zone and thus
comes under the care and protection of the
International Operations Group. Fishing
vessels from other nations are
occasionally found operating illegally
within these waters. With the vast
distance to mainland Australia and
limited resources on the Islands, a
successful prosecution becomes much
more of a challenge for the group.
Another Australian territory coming
under the watchful eyes of the
International Operations Officers is that of
the Heard and McDonald Islands.
Situated below the Antarctic Convergence
Zone and nearly 2,300 nautical miles
southwest of the Australian mainland, the
surrounding waters of these islands are
home to the highly prized Patagonian
toothfish (Dissostichus eliginoides). 
Patrols have been made to the area since
early 1998. Over the years, these patrols
have resulted in the apprehension of
several illegal foreign fishing vessels. In
January this year, a patrol to the region set
out with several aims. Initially meant to
maintain a surveillance presence in the
area, the patrol created history by taking
the first step in what will become an
ongoing level of international
co-operation and assistance. Liaison with
French authorities has paved the way for
future joint support and operations in the
region.
Only two licensed Australian trawlers are
permitted to fish within the AFZ of these
islands. However, in recent years, other
nations have fished illegally in the area. 
Once again, the distance from the
mainland and the extreme weather
conditions prove hazardous to operations
conducted by the group in this region. 
Specialized boarding procedures,
equipment and techniques have been
developed by officers to ensure safe and
effective outcomes. 
Prosecution
Two Australian Navy patrols to the area
resulted in three illegal foreign fishing
vessels being apprehended and
prosecuted. Regular patrols to this remote
area are now being undertaken using a
civilian chartered vessel. Illegal fishing
activity in the region appears to have
lessened due to the much publicized
apprehension of the three fishing vessels
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and the presence of International
Operations Officers in the region.  
Although surveillance andcompliance issues appear at theforefront of the group’s duties,
these highly trained officers are equipped
with a diverse range of skills and
experience. In situ delivery of education
services to fisheries-related personnel in
neighbouring countries has also become
an expanding function of the group. 
While enforcement and subsequent
prosecutions can be seen as a deterrent to
breaches of fishing laws, education and
awareness can often help to deter the
initial illegal action. The result is a saving
of time, effort and costs for all concerned,
as well as the protection of natural
resources.
In Indonesia, in May 1999, the first stage
of Project Wakatobi was completed. The
three-month operation took place in the
Tukangbesi Islands group in southeastern
Sulawesi. International Operations
officers trained 53 Marine Park Rangers in
basic marine skills and MCS techniques to
be used in the operation of the newly
established Wakatobi Marine National
Park. Officers also provided community
development assistance by training and
advising locals in the construction of fish
aggregating devices (FADs) and the initial
development of seaweed mariculture
projects. 
As an alternative to apprehension and
prosecution, the project aims, in two ways,
to try and reduce the number of
Indonesian fishermen coming to fish
illegally in Australia—first, by ensuring
the sustainability of local fish stocks, and
second, by developing alternative income
generating opportunities for the
fishermen. Funding for the first stage was
provided by AusAID. Further funding is
being sought to continue the project.
The International Operations Group also
delivers ‘in-country’ Fisheries
Prosecution Workshops on behalf of
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) for
surveillance and fisheries officials of
member nations. Countries benefiting
from the group’s expertise include Fiji,
Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia. Topics
covered during these training courses
include :
• Regional (Pacific) Fisheries Law
• Distant-water Fishing Nation
(DWFN) Operations
• Longline fishing
• Purse-seine fishing
• DWFN vessel construction
• Illegal reef platform fishing - use of
sodium cyanide and explosives
• Boarding procedures
• Evidence gathering
• Basic search techniques
• Note-taking techniques
• Preparation of acceptable written
statements
• Giving evidence in court
• Catch calculations and freezer
capacities (volumetrics)
• Design and supervision of an
apprehension boarding scenario
• Design and supervision of a mock
fisheries prosecution trial.       
As the world’s marine fishery resources
come under greater pressure, the need for
effective management will become even
more vital. The International Operations
Group of Fisheries Western Australia is
well equipped to not only meet the
world’s current demands of MCS and
training, but the future expectations as
well.  
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Fisheries Officer, International
Operations Group, Fisheries 
Western Australia (email:
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Traditional fishers
Pink gold, muddy waters
A neglect of its traditional fisheries 
sector could spell jeopardy for Madagascar 
Looked at in terms of its resources,Madagascar is a rich country, withits spices, precious stones and rich
fish stocks. Yet, more than half of
Malagasies are living below the poverty
line, with declining per capita incomes. In
recent years, this increased poverty and
hunger has encouraged a reverse
migration from urban areas, such as
Tananarive, to traditional fishing
communities. Up to 100,000 Malagasies,
men and women, are employed in the
traditional fisheries sector, and the
numbers are growing. The traditional
fisheries sector provides not only
employment but also a source of protein
to coastal communities, with 70 per cent of
the fish protein consumed in Madagascar
derived from the sector. 
However, the role of the fisheries sector in
meeting the protein needs of an
increasingly impoverished Malagasy
population could be even greater, if the
underdeveloped nature of Madagascar’s
transport and public utilities
infrastructure (poor or non-existent road
links, the absence of electricity and hence
cold storage facilities, etc.) did not
effectively isolate coastal fishing
communities from inland markets. This
lack of economic integration keeps
national fish consumption down to below
7.5 kg per capita per annum. This
effectively limits the scope for the
development of the traditional fisheries
sector, which primarily serves the
underdeveloped national market.
Were these infrastructural constraints to
be addressed, a national market for cheap
fish protein could be developed. This
would give a major stimulus to the
traditional fisheries sector, generating
employment and increased cash incomes
for an expanding sector. This would,
however, require substantial investments
to overcome the physical and economic
isolation of traditional coastal fishing
communities. 
While the traditional sector accounts for
50 per cent of the national fish catch, this
largely consists of small pelagic and spiny
lobsters. Access to the commercially
high-value tuna and shrimp resources are
largely closed to the traditional fisherfolk.
EU-based fisheries operators, however, are
strongly represented in these sectors.
Since 1986, the EU has concluded five
fisheries agreements with Madagascar.
Initially, these agreements secured access
to both the shrimp and tuna fisheries. At
the end of the 1980s, however, access for
EU vessels to the shrimp fishery under the
fisheries agreement was discontinued.
Since then, the EU-Madagascar fisheries
agreement has been exclusively a tuna
agreement. 
The agreement has, however, provided
access for an increasing number of EU tuna
vessels. Under the latest agreement,
which runs from May 1998 until 2001,
access is provided to 75 tuna purse-seiners
and long-liners, up from 58 under the
previous agreement and 27 under the
initial fisheries agreement. This tuna
agreement, along with similar agreements
with the Comoros, Seychelles and
Mauritius, provides EU tuna vessels with
access to the entire Indian Ocean tuna
fishery. 
Discrimination
Malagasy seafarers often face a hard time
on EU tuna vessels. Discrimination is
rampant, with unequal salaries and
contractual conditions. Malagasy
seafarers can find themselves dumped in
strange lands at the end of their contracts,
with no rights of repatriation. Since 1995,
with the assistance of the Coalition for Fair
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Fisheries Agreements (CFFA) and CFDT (a
French maritime trade union), the issue of
Malagasy seafarers’ rights has been raised
with French boatowners. 
To date, however, they have deniedbeing the employers of theMalagasy seafarers. Against this
background, a round-table discussion is
planned to: clarify the responsibilities of
employers; elaborate on collective
bargaining rights; and discuss the possible
inclusion of a code of fair practice for
workers on board EU vessels in future
fisheries agreements.
Under the current fisheries agreement,
175,000 euros have been allocated to the
Maritime Institute in Madagascar for the
training of seafarers, so they can obtain the
internationally recognized qualification.
Unfortunately, this still requires a sizeable
‘own contribution’ from seafarers and,
hence, remains unaffordable. A further
125,000 euros were allocated to the
traditional fisheries sector. 
To date, however, as far as the fishermen
can tell, these funds have not been used in
their sector. In addition, in recent
negotiations, the EU representative
expressed the wish to preserve the coastal
zone for traditional fishermen. Local
fishworkers would like to see the 10-mile
exclusion zone established for tuna
vessels applied to the shrimp fishery as
well.
Madagascar benefits from this agreement
in two main ways: through the financial
compensation paid directly to the
government and through the tuna
processing plant established at Diego
Suares. In the latest agreement, financial
compensation paid out totalled 2,280,000
euros, with 60 per cent being deployed in
the fisheries sector in support of research,
training, monitoring and control.
However, only around 5.5 per cent has
been allocated to the development of the
traditional fisheries sector. Since 1992, the
unit value of tuna exports has doubled,
with tuna increasingly being exported in
the processed form.
The ending of EU access to the shrimp
fishery under the EU-Madagascar fisheries
agreement did not result in the
withdrawal of European enterprises from
the Malagasy shrimp fishery.  Indeed,
European enterprises continue to be
heavily involved in what is the most
commercially important component of
the Malagasy fishery, the ‘pink gold’,
namely, the shrimp sector.
Joint ventures
While fisheries agreement access for
shrimp has ended, EU vessels continue to
operate in the Malagasy shrimp fishery
within the framework of joint ventures,
occasionally with financial aid from the
EU’s Financial Instrument for Fisheries
Guidance (FIFG). EU and member States’
aid has also been extended to European
M
a
da
ga
s
c
a
r 
28 SAMUDRA APRIL 2000
companies moving into shrimp
aquaculture. This European corporate
involvement in the Malagasy shrimp
fishery is, however, often complex, with
commercial deals being struck with
Japanese importers and sister companies
from Europe, everything being tied
together in a complex web of
cross-holdings. All in all, however,
European enterprises still play a
dominant role. 
While European investments inthe shrimp fishery do notgenerate much direct
competition for resources with the
traditional fisheries sector, they do
generate competition for priority access to
the coastal fishing zone, while threatening
the sustainability of the coastal marine
ecosystem.
Malagasy law restricts access to fishing in
the two-mile coastal zone exclusively to
non-motorized activities, or, in other
words, exclusively for traditional fishing
activities. This means that industrial
shrimp trawlers are legally prohibited
from fishing there. However, the reality is
that these trawlers commonly fish
illegally within this exclusion zone.
Indeed, figures for 1998 show that more
than two-thirds of the industrial shrimp
trawler catches were made within this
two-mile zone. 
The Malagasy Shrimp Boatowners Group
(Groupement des Armateurs à la Pêche
Crevettière de Madagascar—GAPCM),
argues that respecting the two-mile
exclusion zone imposed on shrimp
trawlers would make exploiting the
shrimp fishery uneconomic. Indeed, it has
gone so far as to suggest that “for strategic
and foreign policy reasons, it would not be
appropriate to apply international Law of
the Sea in Malagasy fisheries rules.”
This flagrant disregard for regulations
safeguarding the two-mile coastal zone
for traditional fisherfolk has resulted in
some serious consequences for the
traditional fisheries sector:
• pollution of the sea from the
dumping of by-catches;
• destruction of fishing gear on
which the traditional fishing
sector depends for its non-shrimp
catches;
• direct conflicts with some
traditional fishermen fishing for
shrimp; and
• increased pressure on non-target
species in general, with seven
tonnes of dead by-catch often
being dumped at sea for every
tonne of live shrimp caught. 
This situation of conflict with, and
undermining of, traditional fishing
activities seems likely to intensify, for, as
shrimp stocks decrease, industrial fishing
pressure within the two-mile exclusion
zone is likely to increase. Indeed, the
GAPCM is strongly pressuring the
Malagasy government to ‘regularize’ the
‘illegal’ situation by lifting the current
two-mile exclusion zone.
Currently, the development of the
traditional sector is seriously constrained
by the lack of access to the domestic
market. Malagasies have seen their per
capita GDP decline from US$480 in 1976 to
US$200 in 2000. They have seen absolute
levels of hunger and malnutrition
increase. Concentrating on programmes
to expand the traditional fisheries sector to
meet the growing food needs of an
increasingly impoverished population
would appear an obvious priority. 
However, between 1985 and 1995, of the
17.8 million ECU in EU funds made
available to projects in the fisheries sector,
less than one per cent was dedicated to the
traditional fisheries sector. As much as 67
per cent went to aquaculture projects, and
a further 13 per cent to a rice-cum-fish
project designed to enhance rural food
security. 
Shrimp fishery
While the traditional sector mainly fishes
for low-value species for the currently
limited local market, in recent years,
traditional fishermen have begun to move
into the shrimp fishery. In 1998, around
2,000 tonnes of shrimp—20 per cent of the
official catches—were caught by
traditional fishermen, although this was
mainly for local consumption. In addition
to poor infrastructure, a major constraint
for the traditional sector is its inability to
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meet the quality standards of the
export-orientated shrimp market.
Unfortunately, the initiatives madeso far by the traditional sector toexploit commercial shrimp
resources have only linked them to a
network of collectors who supply export
houses. Yet they gain little, due to price
fixing, problems of preserving the catch
and the exploitative practices of the
collectors. 
Currently, for every 100 tonnes of shrimp
caught by the industrial sector, only 42
jobs are created, while for every 100
tonnes of shrimp produced in the
aquaculture sector, 44 jobs are created. In
contrast, for every 100 tonnes of shrimp
caught by the traditional sector, 230 jobs
are created. Clearly, therefore, expanding
the role of the traditional sector in the
shrimp fishery, while involving
comparatively little investment, will offer
tremendous scope for alleviating poverty
in Madagascar.  
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This article has been written by
Béatrice Gorez of CFFA, Brussels
(email: gilletp@skypro.be)
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Sport fishing
Angling for disaster
The growing power of sport fishing presents 
a bleak future for small-scale fishers in the West
Discussions about small-scalefishers are commonly driven bythe perspectives of less
developed countries and are analyzed
through formulations such as East vs
West, capital-intensive vs small-scale,
community-based, and private vs
public/community property.
This approach, however, ignores the fact
that small-scale fisheries dominates the
fishing industries of many Western
countries such as Australia, the US and
Canada, amongst others, at least in terms
of employment. In Australia, for instance,
registered fishing vessels under 10 m in
length far outnumber those considered
large (over 24 m).
The participants in these small-scale
fisheries tend to be family businesses,
often multigenerational and characterized
by low levels of both capital investment
and profitability. These fisheries face
many of the same issues as their Eastern
counterparts such as poor fisheries
management, competition from larger
players, and habitat degradation.
Although the issue of access alienation has
cropped up in some of the Eastern
fisheries, Western small-scale fisheries are
facing a major assault on their abilities to
access fish resources, primarily due to the
increasingly influential recreational
angling (sport fishing) sector.
Major fishing closures resulting from
political agitation by numerically
dominant and, commonly, well-funded
angling groups have resulted in
uncertainty, stress and unemployment in
coastal fishing communities, as
governments seek to appease the
recreational sector.
For many of these small fishing
communities, the debate over property
rights has assumed greater validity as
they seek to preserve their way of life and
their ability to earn a living. The downside
of property rights are increasingly being
juxtaposed against the possibility of
extinction.
For generations, recreational anglers have
sought sole access to many inshore fish
stocks. The larger area and greater time
closures for the commercial sector reflect
the previously held view of many fishery
administrators that recreational fishing
was harmless and, therefore, could be
allowed to continue relatively unchecked,
while the more important need of
controlling commercial catches was
addressed.
If we ignore the (probably significant)
impacts of habitat loss and pollution on
these inshore areas, there is mounting
evidence that recreational catches (and
bycatches) have a major impact on inshore
fish stocks in many areas. Recreational
fisheries are not immune from bycatch
either. Discarding rates can be of
commercial-sector proportions. Protected
species are often taken; hooking mortality
can be high; and habitat modification
occurs from intensive boating — these are
some of the more obvious impacts of
angling.
The rise of recreational catches has been
driven by a mix of technology and
increased leisure time. More reliable
outboard engines, cheaper (and better)
fish finders and, more seriously, the
advent of cheap Global Positioning
System (GPS) devices have put
commercial-sector fishing power into the
hands of millions of anglers.
Slow to realize
Fisheries administrators have generally
been slow to recognize this threat. They
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also face handicaps, such as limited
access, for any effective control. A failure
to address the burgeoning recreational
catch has resulted in resource conflict and
demands for politically driven resource
reallocation solutions.
Even as recreational fishers movefurther offshore and begin takinglarger quantities of deeper water
species traditionally thought of as being
limited to the commercial sector, there is a
reluctance by fisheries administrators to
act to limit recreational catches.
The recreational sector makes use of lines
as the dominant means of fishing, while
the most common commercial sector gear
is the net. What better way to limit the
catching power of the commercial sector
than to campaign for net bans?
In the southern US, a number of States
have banned the use of nets as a result of
pressure by sport-fishing interests. A
number of other States have been subject
to major anti-net campaigns. In Florida,
around 5,000 small-scale commercial
fishers were put out of business by a vote
to ban nets. The vote was preceded by a
major television campaign against nets
that the small-scale fishers were unable to
counter, for lack of funds. Although
government funds were made available to
buy back the nets (thus providing some
limited ‘compensation’), the sport-fishing
sector campaigned against such a buyout.
Since the net ban, many related businesses
have closed, rendering several fishers
unemployed. This has become a major
issue, as many fishers were too old for
other jobs, levels of education were low,
and there was no exit programme to
enable fishers to find alternative sources
of employment. In short, the pre-voting
vilification campaign made these people
out to be resource rapists and unworthy of
the support of the wider community.
Similar campaigns are also being waged
in Australia and Canada. In Lake
Macquarie, New South Wales, Australia,
small-scale fishing families have been
subject to five years of intense vilification
by an angling group in a campaign that
has caused great stress and uncertainty.
This campaign has proceeded despite
independent evidence that commercial
catches have been stable for decades, and
recreational catches continue to increase.
Moreover, as occurs elsewhere, the
commercial catch is dominated by
non-angling species such as mullet, and
the recreational catch of many of the
shared species exceeds the commercial
catch.
Small-scale fishers subject to campaigns
by anglers face a major dilemma. The
current management/licensing systems
are not based on strong property rights.
Thus, there is little chance of
compensation for loss of access rights.
Such compensation could have been used
to move into another small business, or to
move elsewhere for fishing, or to
undertake some retraining. Governments
prefer this situation as they want the
flexibility to cater to political pressure at
no cost to the public, and the small size of
many of these fishing communities
mitigates against them forcing
government to allocate funds for an exit
package.
Gone are the days when fisheries
administrators would provide some
protection. The increasing politicization
of these agencies has increased the
uncertainty for small-scale commercial
fishers. Not surprisingly, many of the
fishing communities facing recreational
fishing pressures are seeking greater
security of access. Stronger access rights
have their own downside. The allocation
of tradeable rights, whether they be ITQs
or tradeable input controls, will
undoubtedly change the way fishing
communities operate. Fishing
communities face some hard choices—
change or be phased out. However,
tradeable rights systems do not exist by
themselves. They are the creations of
people, and can thus be designed to
achieve the goals of those who design
them. 
Innovative ways
At the FishRights Conference held in
Perth, Australia in November 1999,
among the highlights were the few
presentations that dealt with innovative
ways of designing rights-based systems
that work for, and not against, fishing
communities. Although the conference
was dominated by the ITQ debate, and
full-fledged, corporate-orientated
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property rights, it was clear that there was
much to be learned from listening to
smaller groups that were designing
rights-based systems that, while far from
perfect in an economic sense, provided
increased security and additional
management tools.
Community ownership mayprovide a halfway house betweenindividual and public ownership,
and may thus provide some of the
protection required by fishers, without all
of the negative consequences of full
privatization.
Such a move may require some
adventurous thinking and some real
leadership from fisheries administrators,
attributes which are not in great supply in
many fisheries agencies. The incentives
for such behaviour are not strong.
Politicians and their appointees, and
angling lobbyists, would not want strong
rights for the commercial sector, as they
have no vested interest in the survival of
small-scale fishers. Fishing communities,
however, do. There is thus a major
challenge to ensure the continuation of
these communities.
The strengthening of rights will cause
changes in the ways these communities
function. However, as the pressure on
coastal resources increases, and the threat
of extinction of these communities
becomes ever present, the palatability of
these changes may also change. Even if
stronger rights do not become the key to
survival, they may at least tip the balance
at the bargaining table when the
reallocation axe falls.
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Fishery co-operatives-5
A time of surrender
The fifth instalment in the series on 
the pioneer of Japan’s co-operative movement
Just when our co-operative movementwas starting to operate smoothly andwe saw some hope for the future, we
were faced with this crucial development.
I became very worried about the future of
the fishing villages and the FCAs in
Hokkaido.
At about that time, we had a large stock of
dried squid and, as there was an
extraordinarily good harvest, the price
plummeted. The price of one bag of squid
fell to ¥80, which was not even enough to
cover our costs. The fishermen had to get
at least ¥90 in order to make a profit. The
merchants in Hakkodate, who claimed
that their city was the nation’s major
trading centre for dried squid, also faced
a severe lack of funds, and had to sell some
of their stocks at a loss.
In an attempt to deal with these problems,
they established the Japan Squid
Distribution Association, and I hoped
that, by dealing with them, we could keep
the price at an acceptable level. 
We sold all the dried squid that Dogyoren
collected from the FCAs in the southern
regions, as well as the stock of the
individual merchants. The price soon
rebounded to ¥95, but the government
again set the official price at ¥80, thereby
spoiling any advantages which the
association had gained.
I had, in fact, negotiated with the Fishery
Agency prior to the announcement, and
they had agreed to a price of ¥97. 
I felt betrayed, but, at the same time, I
realized that this decision had been made
not by the Fishery Agency, but by officials
at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
who had not researched the situation and
did not have enough information to
understand the situation fully.
Furthermore, the aforementioned Japan
Marine Products Trading Company had
considerable deficits. While we were
taking measures to bolster the prices,
Matsuo and I became the subjects of a
police investigation. Certain anonymous
letters had been posted to the police
stating that we were trying to inflate the
prices and keep some of the profit for
ourselves. We insisted that we were
working solely for a system under which
the fishermen could receive their just
benefits.
The merchants also testified in our favour,
by stating that they agreed with the aims
of the association, and that they played an
active part in it and had a share of its
capital. They stated that if they did not
co-operate with us to maintain the market
conditions, all production activities
would stop. The police soon called off
their investigation.
When Dogyoren was first established,
nobody expected it to develop as much as
it did, and, therefore, none of the directors
had wanted to become president of
Dogyoren. Finally, Demachi, a member of
the Hokkaido Prefectural Assembly and
of the Kamoenai FCA, said that he might
undertake the post. 
Managing director
The other directors gave neither their
approval nor disapproval. They simply
said that it was best to leave all the
management matters to me in my post as
managing director. As Demachi also
agreed to leave these affairs to me, he
assumed the post of president. I went
about my daily business, and when
questions about hiring new personnel
arose, I would ask Demachi for his advice
or approval. He always told me to decide
whom to hire, as I was the one who would
work with the employees.
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Nevertheless, he sometimes toldothers that I would never ask forhis advice, and, for a while, I
found his attitude troubling. Then, after
several years during which our business
and number of personnel increased
greatly, Demachi announced a number of
personnel transfers and structural reforms
that I had not been consulted about.
Even though he had the power to make
most decisions regarding Dogyoren, I
protested these moves, because he knew
nothing about the abilities or
compatibility of the employees. Rumours
that the relationship between the
president and the managing director were
bad spread rapidly through the fishing
villages of Hokkaido.
From 1937 to 1941, I was devoted to the
development of Dogyoren, but I decided
to resign my post as managing director in
1941. There was talk in the FCAs of
convening a special general meeting
where Demachi would be asked to resign,
so that I could be promoted to the post of
president. I, however, intended to resign
from Dogyoren, and persuaded them not
to call a meeting. I then informed the
board of directors of my resignation, but
many of the directors still tried to convince
me to stay on. 
However, I had worked hard for
Dogyoren and felt that I needed to rest for
a while, so I decided not to continue.
Demachi resigned at the same time, and
new directors were elected in June 1941.
After I had been off for a year, I was
nominated to assume the post of president
of the Hokkaido Marine Products
Wholesalers Co-operative Association in
May 1942. I accepted the position and
worked for that co-operative for a year
and a half, during which time I learned
much more about fishing goods and about
the distribution of fishery products.
In 1944, I moved again, to the newly
established Hokkaido Fisheries Industry
Organization, previously known as
Dogyoren, which had been restructured
and renamed by the military government.
The FCAs were also forced to change back
to Fisheries Associations, which were
established separately in each
municipality.
The co-operative movement, which was
based on the principles of independence
and solidarity, was thus forced to
surrender its ideals to those of the military
government.
No excuses
After the war, many people tried to make
excuses for their co-operation with the
government, but I firmly believed that I
did not have to make any excuses
regarding my devotion to the fisheries
organizations. My motivation had always
been simply to allow the fishermen to
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work for their mutual benefit, even during
wartime.
I remained in the position of managing
director of the HFIO until 1949, when the
New Fishery Co-operative Law was
enacted. This law incorporated the
international principles of co-operatives,
which are standard the world over.
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Fisheries research
oneFish, many uses
The oneFish Community Directory is a new Web-based 
tool for researchers and academics working in the area of fisheries
The oneFish Community Directoryis a Web-based knowledgemanagement system that draws
together a broad cross-section of
stakeholders within the fisheries and
aquatic research community. The primary
aim of oneFish is to raise the profile of
fisheries and aquatic research, and
reinforce its impact on responsible
fisheries development. 
oneFish represents a fundamental
advance in devolved management
information systems. It responds to long
sought-after information, communication
and networking needs of the many
agencies currently actively engaged in the
complex process of promoting more
responsive fisheries and aquatic resources
research and development. These include
donors, NGOs, national aquatic research
centres (NARS), international
organizations such as FAO, universities,
consultancies and others. The design of
oneFish has been demand-led in that it
integrates into one interactive system
many of the communication ideas and
needs articulated by these organizations. 
It allows users to contribute information
in electronic form to specific subject areas,
including by email for those with limited
Web access; and to search and retrieve
information, files and other linkages
across the whole oneFish domain.
Institutions and special interest groups
will be able to use oneFish to develop
discussion groups and create ‘virtual’
offices; and many subject specialist Topic
Editors will assist in the administration of
specialized topics by editing, adding and
ranking the information submitted to
them. 
The software underlying oneFish is being
developed by SIFAR and the FAO Fisheries
Department in partnership with the
World Agriculture Information Centre
(WAICENT). The design team has spent the
last year developing a prototype which is
now undergoing intensive testing by a
small group of fisheries specialists.
Version1 will be released during April
2000. 
Many of you who use the Internet will
already be familiar with directories or
portals such as Yahoo! and Netscape.
Over the last few years, these have played
a significant role in revolutionizing the
ways in which vast amounts of
information are both managed and
accessed on the Internet. You may also be
familiar with the new, ‘open-content’
directories like Netscape’s Open
Directory Project which recognize the
need to devolve the management of
information to the user community. By
making available powerful Web
infrastructure, they allow users to define
and manage their own information needs,
a strategy which has proven massively
successful, as it enhances users’ ability to
obtain relevant information more easily
and efficiently from an ever increasing
morass of online electronic data. 
The oneFish Community Directory draws
on the design philosophy of these
open-content directories; in fact, it goes
much further. Rather like a thematic
library, its specialist focus will ensure both
quality of content and relevance to user
needs. 
Powerful repository
oneFish is a powerful repository for
information based around specific subject
areas; however, in addition to linking
Websites, it permits the uploading of most
current electronic media (that file on your
C drive; that bibliography sitting in your
dusty diskette box; your favourite
ListServe group; GIS maps, and so on) and
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the creation of multiple relationships
between these; it enables the
establishment of virtual offices from
which individuals and organizations can
manage their knowledge (for example,
projects, contacts) and share it, sometimes
selectively, with others with similar
interests. 
References to information that is notin electronic form can be added, ascan links to electronic information
stored elsewhere. In addition, oneFish will
allow submission of notes and comments
on other people’s contributions, and the
establishment and participation in
discussions and debates on their own and
related topics. Finally, opinions on current
issues, news items and relevant diary
dates can be added at any topic level in
oneFish, thus enabling clearly identifiable,
subject-specific headline pages. 
Volunteer Topic Editors will assist in
administration, by editing, adding,
collating and ranking the information
submitted to them. oneFish will deploy a
comprehensive suite of editorial tools,
allowing these Topic Editors to
collaborate in the administration and
development of the system. 
The Topic Editors will be responsible for
the content and quality of their own
particular topic areas, culling out the bad
and obsolete material, and keeping only
the best. 
Although oneFish will provide the
opportunity for everyone to contribute,
like any community, it requires ground
rules. An Editor-in-Chief is responsible for
developing and managing the top-level
categories, overseeing the creation of new
sub-categories, and removing
inappropriate items. It will also be the role
of the Chief Editor to facilitate the
selection of topical material for news,
create user polls and update the fisheries
calendar. 
To accommodate the many different ways
in which individuals perceive things,
oneFish offers several innovative
approaches to information retrieval, one
of which is the introduction of
‘worldviews’. oneFish worldviews are
multiple-topic trees, each of which leads
the user down a unique pathway, but
ultimately arriving at the same piece of
information. 
Different pathways
These pathways include: Top-down—a
more formal approach to fisheries
research and development, and
Bottom-up—a more collaborative,
people-centred and participatory view.
Other worldviews are Geography;
Ecosystem; Species; and People. While
scientists might prefer Ecosystems or
Species, field workers may find
Bottom-up more relevant; institutional
workers may find Top-down more
appropriate to their needs. If you wish to
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find information on a particular
institution or country, then the People and
Geography worldviews may make sense
to you. In addition to all these pathways,
a powerful search engine will facilitate
simple and advanced searching and
retrieval across the whole oneFish
domain.
While oneFish builds on thedesign philosophy of Internetopen-content directories, the
overall concept of oneFish is a natural step
forward in the development of aquatic
information systems. For many years,
various, often disparate, groups within
the fisheries research community have
been developing aquatic information
systems—some on specialized subject
areas, some for special formats or types of
information—and providing, usually
limited, access to these information
systems through various means. 
The most successful and enduring of these
information systems, for example, the
Aquatic Sciences and Fisheries Abstracts
(ASFA) database, are those that foster
input, co-operation and participation by
those actually involved in fisheries and
aquatic research. 
Fisheries and aquatic bulletin boards and
discussion lists are other examples of
information or communication services
that have grown to be very well used.
Again, this is because they provide an
avenue for those working within a specific
thematic area to communicate, discuss
and proffer their ideas and opinions, and
feel that they are influencing the debate. 
The concept of oneFish builds on this
participatory approach. oneFish does not
compete with other Internet resources—it
unifies them within a holistic fisheries
portal, while simultaneously providing
context for them within relevant subject
areas. In this sense, oneFish’s approach to
compiling and linking diverse
information types from disparate sources
is truly innovative. 
oneFish is thus seen as an inclusive and
facilitating communications tool which,
through raising the profile of fisheries
research, will encourage participatory
approaches to disseminating and sharing
of information. 
oneFish will offer a new online Fisheries
Project Information System (FIPIS) with
several more dimensions to the original
system operated from FAO. From the
outset, oneFish will include over 5,500
project records imported from the old
FIPIS. Soon after, project information from
several major fisheries donor agencies,
international institutions and projects
involved in fisheries research will be
added. This will provide a greater
visibility of what research and
development is being undertaken in the
fisheries and aquatic sector, and who is
supporting, funding and implementing
that research. 
oneFish will allow researchers and
scientists on active projects to foster
awareness of their work, and to more
speedily disseminate interim results of
research, including field notes, working
papers and other data. It will also allow
users to establish links between any
project and any related information. 
Access to the World Wide Web by many
of the poorer developing countries is
currently very limited or non-existent.
Nevertheless, the explosion in global
telecommunications, fuelled particularly
by private sector investment and lowering
costs, can not be ignored. There are also
plans to provide regular CD-ROM outputs
from oneFish from early 2001, as well as
the additional facility of selective
dissemination by email. This will ensure
even wider access in areas where using the
Internet is not yet feasible. 
In addition to its role as a global facilitator
of information flows, oneFish is expected
to play an ever growing role for staffs of
fisheries projects, in fisheries NARS, local
fisheries organizations and NGOs. 
Growing networking
Already, in many countries, local
organizations and NGOs are using the Web
and email for fostering more effective
communications. Day by day, the
numbers are accelerating. Linking these
groups together will eventually serve to
facilitate the greater integration of
research with more general development
objectives, such as the sustainable and
economic use of resources, poverty
alleviation, and the development of
research proposals and projects that are
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more responsive to the needs and
capacities of all stakeholders. 
oneFish aims to dissolve the traditional
boundaries between research and the
pressing needs of sustainable
development. As oneFish develops, it will
provide the fisheries research community
with the largest fully integrated global
collection of online information on
fisheries research and development.
oneFish will be a tool for all and, as a
result, it will grow and develop according
to the needs and requirements of those
stakeholders, a truly responsive approach
to the information needs of the fisheries
and aquatic research community.
oneFish development is currently being
sponsored by DFID (UK), Norway, ICEIDA,
CIDA, IDRC, The World Bank, UNDP, and
FAO. For more information, contact:
oneFish Project, Support Unit for
International Fisheries and Aquatic
Research, FAO Fisheries Department, Viale
delle Terme di Caracalla, Rome 00100
ITALY. (www.oneFish.org)
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South Africa 
Not an easy task
These comments on the implementation of South Africa’s 
new fisheries policy are a rejoinder to an earlier SAMUDRA Report article
In SAMUDRA Report No. 24 (December1999), Brian O’Riordan presents anextensive review of the situation in
South Africa’s fishing sector. It is rather
depressing reading: “a tale of chaos and
corruption”. Even for people who have
spent more than two weeks touring the
fisheries sector, there are disturbing
trends and accounts, running completely
counter to the goals of equity and the
redressing of historical imbalances.
Nevertheless, the article shows a poor
understanding of the process, and it is
even poorer in advancing “sweeping and
enlightened reforms”. Therefore, a few
comments from another outsider, who has
followed the process since 1994. 
The policy process leading up to the
Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) of
1998 was a long and complicated one,
from the first ANC-based initiatives in
1994, through almost five years of
negotiating within the Fisheries Policy
Development Committee, leading to the
White Paper and the MLR Bill and then to
the final MLR Act, approved by Parliament
in May 1998. 
Of course, a lot of things could have been
done differently, but, by and large, this
was an open process, incorporating a large
number of actors, who had never met
before. More groups could have been
consulted and more effort could have
been put into publicizing the final Act, but
this would hardly have changed the
result. 
The fisheries policy of South Africa, just as
in most other countries, is a compromise,
where the outcome is defined by the
political strength of the contending forces.
Compared to the situation in most other
African countries and quite a few
European ones as well, the fisheries policy
process in South Africa was transparent
and inclusive. The most crucial issue all
through the policy planning was the
extent to which the transformation
process should be allowed to disturb the
existing industrial set-up. Noting, as
O’Riordan rightly does, that most
resources are fully utilized, redistribution
means taking away from Peter in order to
give to Paul. 
The greatest impediment to a large-scale
redistribution has, of course, been ‘big
business’, but not alone! Organized labour
played along with big business all the
while. Not surprisingly, the fishworkers’
union (FAWU) and other unions would like
to protect the employment of their
members, thus emphasizing industrial
stability. (That the same unions would
now like to operate as quota owners as
well is an interesting paradox, implying
all the familiar problems that go with
wanting to sit on both sides of the table.
But this is a general phenomenon in South
Africa, not limited to the fishing industry
alone.)
At the end of the day, the South African
fisheries policy is a ‘negotiated
revolution’, just like the rest of the
‘revolution’ leading to ANC’s remarkable
rise to power in 1994. Parts of the
negotiations precisely ensured that
established owners and workers had a
certain security and a ‘sunset clause’ for
the bureaucrats. That we can lament, but
to little avail. The challenge is to see what
can be accomplished, given these
limitations.
Pros and cons
A lot can be said of quota systems and
their usefulness in small-scale fisheries. It
was, nevertheless, the system preferred by
a great majority of politicians in the South
African Parliament, including the ANC
representatives. It could have been much
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worse! In the White Paper, a suggestion
was made to hand out transferable fishing
rights for perpetuity, while, in the final
Act, we are dealing with fishing rights
leased to the operators for a maximum of
15 years duration. Furthermore, all
transfers have to be authorized by the
State, thereby limiting the freedom of the
established owners. 
Again, there were alternatives, butthe alternatives presented by thesmall-scale fishers never
succeeded in attracting any political
support. Open access within fixed TACs
never caught on because such a system is
a waste of effort, bad for marketing and
generally benefits only the established
‘highliners’, that is, the most clever and
efficient fishers. Other alternatives were
rather unclear as to who should have the
right to fish. That also applies to the idea
of community quotas, which had been an
administrative catastrophe in the past.
Whatever the case, it is important to stress
that South Africa has got a system rather
different from what was originally
envisaged, based on the ITQ systems of
New Zealand and Iceland. 
No doubt, there has been a tremendous
interest for acquiring quotas. More than
5,000 have applied for the 1999/2000
fishing season. When one out of ten is
successful, no wonder rumours quickly
start circulating about corruption and
undue influence. It is still worth having a
historical perspective of this process. In
the past, until 1998, the so-called apolitical
Quota Board allocated the quotas. Then,
friends and cronies of the Minister and
members of the National Party were quite
successful, and, later, also people with
good ANC contacts. Today, it is clearly
stated that the allocation of quotas is a
political responsibility, where the
Minister is accountable, together with the
government. 
There are, furthermore, criteria as to who
should get access, and there has been
established a process of redress for the
unsuccessful. According to our
investigations, there are very few cases
where the Minister has actually
intervened, overruling the
recommendations of the Chief Director,
based on the screening process in the
Directorate of Marine and Coastal
Management (MCM). These procedures
can, no doubt, be improved, but they are
considerably better than the old, at least
seen from the perspective of the new
entrants.
Allocations, according to the new Act,
have only been done for the last two years,
so far with relatively modest results. If we
start calculating from 1994, when the new
dispensation got into power, the
redistribution would constitute
approximately 25 per cent of the
important hake quota and 31 per cent of
the West Coast rock lobster quota, to
mention only two of the most disputed
fisheries. A relatively large number of new
entrants have been brought into the
industry, with small quotas per entrant. 
The large companies are still dominating,
holding the lion’s share of the total quotas,
but the trend is definitely working in the
direction of a more diversified ownership.
Whether this is good or bad depends
entirely on what the new entrants are
doing with their quotas. At present, we
have a number of ‘paper quota owners’,
people who have been allocated a small
quota and who then sell or lease it to
established operators for cash. That is to
be expected, since the two years needed to
acquire equity is too long a period if you
have no access to capital other than the
value of the quota(s). 
Whatever the result of the redistribution
process, there are bound to be a large
number of dissatisfied applicants.
Everybody can not possibly receive a
quota. In 1999/2000 alone, there were
more than 900 applicants for West Coast
rock lobster. If all, excluding the old
operators but including the recent new
ones, should have an equal share, this
would have turned out to be 1.6 tonnes per
operator, to be diminished every year, as
new entrants enter the race. This is hardly
the quantity that would make for a viable
industry.
Difficult aim
Implementing a new and rather ambitious
policy is difficult, and it will probably take
years before the new administrative
system is up and running. (Why do we
expect wonders from a Third World
country like South Africa, when even
European fishing nations would have
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problems of standing up to the same
standards?) Unfortunately, the ideas put
up by the Artisanal Fishers Association
are not very helpful, even if they may have
a considerable potential for political
mobilization. 
I certainly agree with O’Riordan thatapartheid destroyed the artisanalfisheries of South Africa, but precisely
for this reason, restitution is not a viable
route. (After 40 years, who should be
making restitution and with what?)
Looking forward is, therefore, more
productive. As of year 2000, there are at
least five major problems which have to be
solved:
The most important task at the moment is
to get a transformation schedule or plan,
outlining the political vision by year
2000/2001 and then, five years from now,
set specific targets on how much is going
to be reallocated in each of the 17 fisheries.
Such a plan has been missing all along the
process, creating considerable insecurity
among established operators, and
confusion among new entrants as to what
is realistic or possible in terms of
reallocation. Such a plan should also
contain where (in which sector) new
entrants can most easily be
accommodated. It goes without further
saying that certain sectors like West Coast
rock lobster, abalone, longlining, etc.
require much less capital than others like
trawling for deep-sea hake.
Secondly, it is necessary to strengthen the
capacity and competence of the unit
dealing with applications in the fisheries
directorate (MCM). This should also
include the establishment of a watchdog
unit to check the validity of the
information forwarded by the applicants
and for follow-up, to see that
organizational entrepreneurs do not kick
out the true fishermen as soon as they
have secured a fishing right. Furthermore,
it is necessary to simplify the allocation
criteria, so that the process appears as
transparent as possible.
Thirdly, there is an urgent need to
establish training schemes, especially in
business skills. Many of the new rights
holders do not have even the most
rudimentary business skills and,
therefore, fall easy prey to established
owners in all types of ‘joint ventures’. If
business entrepreneurs are the ones going
to transform the South African fishing
industry, they certainly need assistance
also in terms of easy credit. The
requirement of obtaining equity within
two years based on the fishing right as the
only collateral is clearly unrealistic.
Assistance to create more efficient
organizations should also be considered,
keeping in mind that a number of
programmes are much more efficient if
run through organizations comprising the
target groups.
Finally, there is a need to introduce a
resource fee. In the MLR Act, there is a
provision for introducing a leasing fee for
the fishing right. This has not yet been
introduced, probably due to heavy
resistance from established operators.
Nevertheless, a resource fee is, in the end,
what society gets back from the fishing
industry for having the privilege of using
a national resource. Experiences, lately
from Iceland, show the weak legitimacy of
a policy where the national resource is
handed out for free, benefiting only the
original operators.
O’Riordan’s account ends with the
moving in of a team of investigators,
looking into the alleged corruption of the
present fisheries administration. Today,
we know that most of the fuss was due to
certain bureaucratic shortcuts and had
little to do with personal enrichment
through bribery. I do not deny the
possibility of bribes (quite common under
the old dispensation), but I do think this is
often too easy a way out of a dilemma, that
is, of explaining why everybody can not
get a quota! In South Africa, just as in
Norway or the EU, the challenge is to
weigh social equity against biological
sustainability and economic efficiency.
That is a truly political task, with few fixed
answers.
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Hersoug of the Norwegian College
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Tromsø, Norway (email:
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Common-property fishing rights
Redistributing wealth
The use of Individual Transferable Quotas as a 
resource management measure must not be summarily dismissed
Parzival Copes’ arguments againstthe use of Individual TransferableQuotas (ITQs) for the management
of fisheries (“Coastal resources for
whom?”, SAMUDRA Report No. 23,
September 1999) are not particularly
helpful to those responsible for making
decisions on the formulation of
management measures. Although ITQs
will not work in many situations, they,
nevertheless, provide an important tool
which should not be rejected for the
wrong reasons.
It is abundantly evident that overfishing is
becoming more severe and more
pervasive throughout the world and that
it affects small-scale fisheries as much as it
does large-scale fisheries. The basic
problem is that the supply of fish stocks is
limited and yet the demand for fish
products is growing. This leads to rising
prices and, in the absence of effective
controls, increased fishing effort. The
result is the depletion of stocks as well as
the excessive use of capital and labour. 
Better management of fisheries is
essential. Management measures can deal
either solely with the biological aspects or
with both biological and economic
aspects. In the past, many of the measures
dealt only with the biological yield,
ignoring the economic consequences.
These kinds of measures included total
catch limits, closed seasons, closed areas,
mesh size controls and others designed to
restore stocks to their maximum
sustainable yields (MSY). These were
frequently adopted because they
presumably affected all fishermen equally
and did not change the distribution of
wealth (a presumption that was often
wrong). 
Although such measures may be desirable
in conjunction with other measures, they
do not always achieve their objective of
restoring the stocks. Moreover, they do
nothing to prevent excessive fishing effort
or conflict among competing users. The
difficulty is that measures that prevent
excessive fishing effort or that deal with
conflict, require decisions on the
distribution of wealth. This can not be
avoided. As Copes has pointed out, an ITQ
system provides individual quotas to
some fishermen but not to others. What he
did not point out, however, is that a
system limiting fishing effort directly, by
granting licences to some of the fishermen,
also distributes wealth. He states that “to
remain economically healthy, the
small-boat sector must accept the need to
keep fishing capacity in balance with
available harvests. This will probably
require occasional reductions in fleet size
by buy-back, in order to offset likely
advances in fleet productivity.” 
Copes has failed to note that the provision
of territorial rights to a community of
fishermen (which he advocates and which
I agree may generally be desirable)
provides wealth to that community and
excludes fishermen who are not members
of the community.
Copes states that “typically, most inshore
fish resources have lent themselves well to
harvesting by locally based small-scale
fishermen.” While this may currently be
true in certain situations, it is becoming
less and less valid, and is unlikely to
continue into the future. 
Population growth
It is clear that eventually, as population
grows and demand increases, decisions
on the distribution of wealth will have to
be made. Even the exclusion of large-scale
fishing vessels from the waters used by
small-scale fishermen will not preclude
the eventual necessity for determining
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how access within the group of
small-scale users will be allocated. Since
this is presently necessary in many
situations and will be increasingly
necessary in the future, it is desirable to
examine all the various techniques for
controlling access, including the use of
ITQs.
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Francis Christy, Senior Research
Officer, IMARIBA, Washington DC, US
(email: imariba@sprynet.com)
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Fishing technology
Mechanization ahoy!
Technological change has transformed 
the living standards of fishermen in southern Sri Lanka 
The post-war period in Sri Lankawas characterized by rapid rates ofgrowth of population that exerted
tremendous pressure on food supplies. In
order to face the new challenges, the State,
which assumed a regulatory role during
the pre-war period, took an active
role—one of reformism—to expand fish
production. Many technological
innovations have been introduced to
fisheries since then, with major emphasis
on mechanization. The State intervention
in fisheries was mainly characterized by
measures adopted to improve traditional
crafts and gear, introduction of new
fishing techniques and the development
of fisheries infrastructure to facilitate
reaping the full benefits of the above
measures. In order to help the asset-poor
fishermen to adopt the new technology, a
large array of credit schemes were
implemented through the State-owned
banks. It was envisaged that all these
measures would lead to large increases in
production, while improving the living
standards of the resource users.
Since the late 1930s, experiments have
been conducted by the State to introduce
suitable mechanized crafts into Sri Lankan
fisheries, and the results of such
experiments led to the introduction of four
main types of mechanized vessels;
mechanized crafts with outboard engines
(the most commonly used craft is the 17-23
ft fibre-glass FRP boat); one-day operating
craft (ODOC) with inboard engine;
multi-day operating craft with inboard
engine and ice compartment (MDOC);
small trawlers (10-11 tonne boats). 
The latter craft did not become very
popular among the fishermen in Sri
Lanka, mainly due to its high initial cost.
The MDOC is the only craft used by the
fishermen to exploit deep-sea fish
resources. Along with the mechanized
craft, new fishing gear and fishing
techniques were also introduced into Sri
Lankan fisheries.
The new fish-catching technology
introduced was essentially an
‘output-enhancing’ technology. With its
ability to engage in year-round fishing, the
mechanized craft enabled the fishermen to
stabilize inter-temporal flows of fishing
incomes. Yet, the new technology was
highly capital-biased and its adoption
demanded an array of inshore and
offshore facilities. 
A modern craft, such as the MDOC with
accompanying gear, cost about SLRs
1,593,000 in 1994, as against SLRs 24,500 for
a non-mechanized traditional craft (NMTC)
and accompanying gear. By 1998, the cost
of an MDOC with accessories amounted to
SLRs 3-4 million (US$ 1 =  SLRs 70). 
Costs of crafts & 
accompanying gear (1994)
Type of Craft Cost of Craft
(SLRs.)
Cost of Gear
(SLRs.)
MDOC
1 1,307,000 205,300
ODOC
1 784,621 77,500
FRP
2 72,000 78,000
MTC
3 14,100 58,000
NMTC
4  5,700  6,200
1 with 34 hp engine
2 18.5 feet FRP boat with 15 hp OBM
3 Mechanized Traditional Craft—17.8 feet fibre
  glass canoe with 8 hp OBM
4 9 feet wooden theppam
(Source: Field studies, 1994)
No savings
Although ordinary fishermen are unlikely
to have savings sufficient enough to meet
the heavy capital funds required for the
purchase of modern crafts and gear, this
technology showed a high rate of
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diffusion within the coastal community of
Sri Lanka.
The 1970s marked the era of a ‘bluerevolution’ (the technologicalrevolution in marine fisheries),
where the rate of adoption of mechanized
fishing took place at a rapid pace. This
period also coincided with rapid increases
in fish production—from 85,229 tonnes of
fish in 1971 to 206,843 tonnes in 1981. The
degree of mechanization of fishing crafts
reached the 50 per cent mark by the
mid-1980s and remained around that level
since then. 
Quite interestingly, the State had played a
commendable role as an agent of change
or a catalyst in the drive towards the
mechanization of Sri Lankan fisheries. A
large amount of subsidies have gone into
fisheries since the early 1960s to enable
fishermen to acquire mechanized crafts
and engines. 
The increased craft issues during the 1960s
and 1970s coincided with the period of
rapidly increasing rate of mechanization
of fishing crafts. The late 1970s and early
1980s also marked a significant increase in
the amount of subsidies granted to
fisheries. 
It is quite apparent that the State has taken
an active role in the process of
technological change in fisheries. It has
also been able to shift fishing effort from
one set of resources to another by
changing the nature of craft and engine
issued under subsidy schemes. 
For Sri Lankan fishermen, both formal and
informal sources of credit are important.
The financial intermediaries involved in
the formal sector consist of State-owned
commercial banks, fisheries co-operatives
and the Ministry of Fisheries, while the
informal sources consist of private
moneylenders, fish merchants, boutique
owners, fellow fishermen and kinsmen.
While professional moneylenders of the
informal credit market and the
institutional credit agencies of the formal
credit market are ready to advance credit
at comparatively moderate rates of
interest to the agriculturist who offers his
land as a collateral, those very same
lenders are reluctant to advance money to
fishermen, considering that the latter have
no reliable security to offer them, in
compensation for the risk they take. 
No collateral
Fishing craft and gear are the only assets
owned by fishermen, and these depreciate
rapidly and also bear the risk of damage
and loss at sea.  Therefore, fishermen’s
access to credit is limited by
‘collateral-specific risks’. Therefore,
fishermen are put at a serious
disadvantage in the credit market because
many lenders consider them less
creditworthy. State involvement in
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providing the fishermen with funds under
various credit schemes can be viewed as a
measure taken to redress the above
situation.
Fixed capital, such as crafts, engines,gear and other accessories amountto sizeable investments. All types of
craft owners in the south of Sri Lanka
depend, to a considerable extent, on
external funds to secure their fixed capital
needs. 
Credit has been important in the
acquisition of both crafts and gear. Total
borrowals added up to large amounts. The
higher the degree of mechanization, the
higher has been the average amount of
credit required. Both formal and informal
sources have been equally important for
all types of craft owners in securing their
fixed capital needs. 
Formal sources have provided almost 60
per cent of all credit required by
fishermen. Although they have played an
equally important role, the co-operative
lending schemes can be considered the
most successful, taking into account the
fact that lending facilities of this source
were extended to all types of craft owners.
One should also not undermine the
important role played by the fish
merchant, contributing 22 per cent to the
total credit amount. Contributions of the
moneylender and fellow fishermen have
been quite low, which, among other
things, reveal the inability of these sources
to meet the large loan amounts demanded
by fishermen to acquire modern crafts and
gear.
Naturally, we expect a fisherman
adopting modern technology to perform
better and live better than one who
continues to use traditional technology.
Comparison of living standards of
fishermen across different technological
categories will provide us with
information on the relative strength of
these technological types in making the
fishermen better-off and, also on the
pattern of social stratification of fishing
communities. 
There is a very high degree of variation of
incomes of fishermen within a particular
technological category. Interestingly,
there are fishermen in modern fisheries
whose incomes exceed SLRs 20,000 a
month, which is comparable to the
monthly salary of an executive in a private
company or a university academic in Sri
Lanka. 
Monthly returns
The monthly returns of asset owners are
higher than the monthly income of crew
workers (with the exception of NMTC),
indicating that asset owners earn more
than those who do not own fishing assets.
Of course, if the asset owner is a
fisherman, his income would be much
higher (because he will receive a
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crew-share as well). Evidently, the higher
the degree of mechanization of fishing
crafts, the higher would be the income of
craft owners. Clearly, modernization of
fisheries has brought about an increase in
the living standards of fishermen.
Average incomes of selected 
occupational categories
Sub-sector Occupational category Average 
income
(SLRs/month)
Agriculture Paddy ploughing
Tea plucking
Rubber  tapping
Coconut husking
Coconut plucking
 3,465
 1,958
 1,958
 3,694
 3,522
Building
construction
Master Carpenter
Skilled Helper
Master Mason
Unskilled Helper
 4,460
 3,336
 4,356
 2,534
Fisheries Crew Share - MDOC
Crew Share - ODOC
Crew Share - FRP
Crew Share - MTC
Crew Share - NMTC 
 8,654
 4,741
 4,692
 3,919
 2,694
Adopted from Central Bank, 1998
    
The incomes of fishermen engaged on
mechanized crafts appear to be higher
than those of other occupational
categories (except crew workers of MTC,
who earn incomes slightly below those
earned by skilled workers in the building
construction sector). The crew workers in
traditional fishing earn the same monthly
income as unskilled workers in other
sectors, indicating their relative poverty,
compared to many occupational
categories. 
In general, it is evident that fishermen
who have adopted modern technology
are earning higher incomes than skilled
workers in the unorganized sector.
The new fish-catching technology
introduced to Sri Lanka was essentially a
productivity-enhancing technology that
led to higher average annual fish catches.
However, the adoption of new technology
required the fishermen to make high
capital commitments. The State has
played an important role in helping the
asset-poor fishermen in adopting the new
technology, by way of craft and engine
issues under subsidy schemes. Today,
approximately half of Sri Lanka’s fishing
fleet consist of mechanized crafts.
Fishermen depended heavily on external
funds to secure their fixed capital needs.
The higher the degree of mechanization,
the higher was the average amount of
credit obtained. While both formal and
informal sectors have catered to the fixed
capital demand, the formal sources, such
as the State-owned banks and fisheries
co-operatives, have played a more
important role in the provision of funds
for the acquisition of modern mechanized
crafts. 
Comparison of incomes of fishermen
across different technological categories
revealed that fishermen who adopted
mechanized fishing were able to increase
the level of their incomes. Comparison of
fishing incomes with those of other
occupational categories revealed that
fishermen engaged in mechanized crafts
were earning higher incomes than those
earned by most of the other occupational
categories in the unorganized sector. 
In general, it is well evident that
modernization of fisheries has brought an
increase in the living standards of the
fishermen of southern Sri Lanka.
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A new home
ICSF’s Brussels Office
has shifted to new
premises, and Brian
O’Riordan has taken
over from Pierre
Gillet as secretary.
Please note the name
of the new port of
call: ICSF Brussels
Office, Rue du Midi
165, B-1000 Brussels,
Belgium. Tel: (32) 2
513 1565 Fax: (32) 2
513 73 43 Email:
icsfbrussels@yucom.be
Law’s claws
A new Marine
Environmental
Protection Law,
which went into
effect on 1 April , is
expected to help
China expand its
fishery industry. 
In recent years, the
Fisheries Bureau,
under the Agriculture
Ministry, has
recorded an average
of  80 contamination
cases in China’s seas
annually. 
This has resulted in
yearly losses of 150
million yuan (about
US$18.1 million).
Marine pollution has
caused annual losses
of 240,000 tonnes of
aquatic products in
the Yellow and Bohai
seas. 
Compared to the 1982
version, the new
marine code
delegates the power
of environmental
protection in fishing
grounds and fishing
ports to the Fisheries
Bureau, which will
also act as the
supervisor and
investigator of water
pollution. 
TED not dead
Remember the
contested US ban on
import of shrimp
from all nations not
certified by the US
State Department as
trawling for shrimps
with mechanized
vessels fitted with
turtle excluder
devices (TEDs)?
Well, TEDs live. The
WTO’s Appellate
Body had found that
the US national
certification
requirement
amounted to an
obligation for
exporters to adopt
essentially the same
policy as the US and,
as such, had an
unjustifiably
‘coercive effect’ on
foreign governments’
policy decisions. 
National certification
also discriminated
against exporters that
did use TEDs in
uncertified countries,
as well as against
Asian countries,
which were given
less time and
technical assistance to
adjust to the measure
than their Latin
American
counterparts. 
Furthermore, the
Appellate Body
deemed the
certification process
to be non-transparent
and arbitrary.
It also faulted the US
for not having
seriously sought
multilateral
environmental
co-operation aimed at
protecting
endangered sea
turtles.
In response to these
findings, the US did
not lift the import
embargo, but
changed its appli-
cation guidelines. 
The centrepiece of the
new guidelines is
replacing the
nation-by-nation
certification
requirement by a
shipment-by-
shipment certification
procedure. Changes
were also made to
implement the trade
measure in a more
transparent and non-
discriminatory
fashion. 
In addition to the
new guidelines, the
US will offer technical
training in the design,
construction,
installation and
operation of TEDs.
While the US
government thinks it
has implemented the
WTO ruling in full, its
compliance measures
are contested from
two very different
quarters: the
complainants in the
case and US
conservation
organizations. 
The complainants—
India, Malaysia,
Pakistan and
Thailand—still
maintain that only
lifting the import ban
would constitute
‘good faith
implementation’. 
US conservation
organizations are
equally dissatisfied.
Earth Island Institute,
the Humane Society
of the United States,
the American Society
for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals
and the Sierra Club
have brought a case
against the new
guidelines to the US
Court of International
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Trade, claiming that
they would be
impossible to monitor
and enforce. 
The litigants argue
that shipment-by-
shipment certification
would not effectively
protect sea turtles,
and thus falls short of
adequately fulfilling
the law’s ultimate
purpose. 
In April 1999, the
Court of International
Trade issued a
preliminary ruling
against shipment-by-
shipment
certification, finding
it was ‘on its face not
in accordance’ with
Congressional intent
in passing Section 609.
That section provides
that shrimp
harvested with
technology that may
adversely affect sea
turtles protected by
the US Endangered
Species Act may not
be imported into the
US.
Both sides have
submitted
supplementary
information to the
Court, whose final
decision is still
pending. 
Should the Court
oblige the
government to go
back to
nation-by-nation
certification, a WTO
compliance panel
seems a near
certainty.
Hake stake
Argentina has
decided to cut this
year’s hake catch by
almost two-thirds of
the tonnage fished in
1999, after a report
warned that the
South Atlantic stock
was in a “critical
state”.
Hake is Argentina’s
top catch, making up
half of the US$1
billion fishing
industry’s annual
exports, mainly to
Spain, Japan, Brazil,
Italy and the US.
After a 1994 deal
granted the European
Union (EU) rights to
catch hake, squid and
cod under quotas,
catches of hake off
Argentine shores
touched one million
tonnes. 
Argentina’s
commercial fleet
caught 312,051 tonnes
of hake in 1999, even
though Argentina’s
National Fisheries
Institute (NFI) had set
a 188,200-tonne limit. 
In a report, the NFI
urged  the
government to
suspend the hake
catch altogether this
year or at least limit it
to 110,000 tonnes.
“The total biomass
has been in decline
over time, and the
reproductive biomass
was found to be
below biologically
acceptable levels and
was also showing the
same trend,” the NFI
said. “The fall in the
reproductive biomass
is due to overfishing.
Therefore, future
catches will have to
be low,” it said. “We
can only continue
with a low-level catch
this year.”
Last year, some EU
ships skirted
attempts to suspend
the hake catch, while
12,000 other
fishermen were left
unemployed during
Argentina’s deepest
recession in a decade.
Enforcement has
been a chronic
problem in
Argentina’s 200-mile
economic zone. 
Gown  under
In Australia, women
perform 50 per cent
of administrative
tasks, and contribute
between 26 and 50
per cent of the family
income. 
While most seemed
satisfied with their
role, half of them
yearn for better
recognition and
status for their work. 
These findings come
on the heels of the
launch of the
Women’s Industry
Network (WIN)
Action Plan for
women in the
seafood industry and
a Bureau of Rural
Sciences (BRS) report
on women in the
fishing industry. 
The Action Plan—
Empowering Fishing
Women to Capitalize
on Networks—
responds to findings
in the BRS report and
provides a national
framework for
women in the
seafood industry to
work from, and set,
goals. 
The BRS report,
Fishing for Women:
Understanding
Women’s Roles in the
Fishing Industry,
commissioned by
WIN, is an important
part of the Action
Plan. It provides the
preliminary research
necessary to better
understand the role
of women in the
fishing industry. 
One of the major
findings of the report
was that women’s
roles in the fishing
industry were poorly
reflected in statistics,
including women’s
contributions to
output and
productivity. 
The Federal
Government is
helping a number of
national non-
government rural
women’s groups in
several ways. 
Among other things,
it has given a grant of
Aus$10,000 for WIN
through a
programme designed
for national NGOs. 
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